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Following Ross (1967) I use the term left dislocation (left 
dislocated noun phrase, left dislocated sentence) in referring to 
structures like those in the following set. 1 
(1) 	 a. This room, it really depresses me. 
b .. Women, I'll never be able to figure th~m out. 
c. 	 This spot in the rug, you better get it out 
before the pa~ty on Saturday. 
d. 	 The new Kubrick movie, Bill said Marvin told him 
it was great, 
e, 	 Your second chapter, I haven't gotten around to 
reading it yet. 
f. That ridiculous smile of his, its so phony. 
g. ·Your co.us in Agnes, is she coming? 
h. 	 Thos~ slacks I gave you for your birthday, can 
you still fit.· into them? 
There are in general two ways in which such constructions may be · 
analyzed. One way is to asswue that there is a rule which moves the 
dislocated NP out of a corresponding non-dislocated structure. For 
example, in Ross (1967) it.is suggested that sentences like those in 
(1) are derived from corresponding non-dislocated structures by the 
following rule, 
Left 	Dislocation 
X NP Y 
l 2 3 
2#1 ·2 ·3  
7pro  
Such a rule would optionally convert (2) into (3), the structure 
immediately underlying (la). 
( 2) 
this room really depresses me 
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(3) s. ·J 
.·~~ 
NP . : '. : . S! 
I . . Y· ------
this room NP . ·VP 
I~ 
it really depresses me 
The other possibility is that the dislocated NP exists as such; 
i.e. , as an adjunct to the main sentence, in logical structure. For 
ease of reference I will henceforth refer to these two alternatives as 
·the Extraction Hypothesis (EH) and the Logical Structure Hypothesis 
(LSH) respectively. It is my p~rpose in this paper to argue in favor 
of th.e lat~er alternative, i.e., in favor of LSH. More specifically, 
I will propose that left dtslocated sentences are derived from logical 
structures roughly like (4), where NP1 is the dislocated NP and x a 
variable ranging over the set of objects {which may be only cne)Z 
designated by NP1, ; . 
(4) s 
~ 
~l S' 
~ I 
x1 ••• .J ~ • • • • 
The logical structure of (la)·would then be roughly (la'). 
(la') . s 
~ 
NP S'
. I 1 I 
X1: this room x really depresses me.3 
1,1, In Part I, I will discuss ·some general properties of left 
dislocated sentences and will point out those properties which provide 
support for LSH. It wil], be noted that ·there are apparently no 
properties of left dislocated sentences which provide strong support 
in favor of EH over LSH, though :the reverse is true in a numbe'!' of 
cases. The discussion will be restricted primarily to dislocation in 
the main clause. Some special problems connected with dislocation 
in subordinate clauses will be discussed in the last section of Part 
I • In Part II , I will argue '.that logical· structures like (4) can be 
generalized to non-dislocated sentences as well. Deriving non-
dislocated sentences from struc~ures like (4) would require few rules 
that are not needed in the grammar anyway and would make it possible to 
account for various semantic, syntactic and phonological realtionships 
between Qislocated and non-dislocated sentences in a principled way, 
In particular, such an analysis offers a basis for integrating into the 
grammar a description of topic-comment structure and of the existential 
pre.suppositions associated with .topic noun,phrases. 
J: 
PART 	 I 
2. 	 ·Left Dislocation and Pronominalization. 
Iri order to deriVe left dislocated sentences from·structures like 
(4) it is necessary t~ iri~orporate into the ~r8,!lllilar a rule of feature 
copying. Thie rule copies the features of NP1 onto a corresponding 
variable in S'. A later rule then replaces these features by the 
appropriate pronominal form. An ari~lysis which would incorporate such 
a process into th~ gr'ammar has ali,eady been proposed on independent 
grounds as an a.lterna;tive to the problematic view ot; pronominalization 
which would r~place by a pronominal· form the second of two identical 
noun phrases' ( see , ro:r example, Bach (1968) ) . · 
2.1. Though the noun phrase in S' which corresponds to the dislocated 
noun phrase is generally a pronoun it seems to me that sentences like 
those in (5) are at l·e.ast marginally acceptable, and most of them are 
quite acceptable with a preceding as for or about phrase.
' . 	 --- . 
(5) 	 a. (As for) that book I borrowed from you last week, 
:r hayen 't read that book yet. 
b .. (Concerning) that articie on pronouns, Bill said 
~ary told him tbe.article wasn't worth reading. 
c. ?(What about) your mother, is your mother coming? 
d. ?(As for) beans, I don't like beans at all. 
e.??(Concerning) beans, beans make me sick. 
The acceptability of !these sentences seems to vary in proportion to 
the amount (and nature?) of the material which intervenes between the 
two noun phrases and the extent to which the noun phrases are exact 
copies of one another. It is analogous, I believe, to other sentences 
where morphologically and referentially identical noun phrases are 
repeated in discourse or in two conjoined sentences, e.g., 
(6) 	 I haven't read that book you gave me yet, ·but I 
heard the book was very good. 
(7) ?If beans make you sick, you shouldn't eat the beans. 
(8)??Mary '\>ialked into the room and then Mary sat down. 
The sentences in (5)-1(8) are not as clearly unacceptable, on the other 
hand, as examples like the following, where noun phrases with identical 
subscripts are understood to be coreferential. 
(9) 	"John1 isaid that John1 would·stay.
,{r told Harry1 that Harry1 couldn't go to the party. 
*Maryl :doesn't like Mary1 . 
, On the basis of these facts I pr;opose that the grammar be allowed to 
generate sentences l~ke those in (5) and that they be assigned various 
degrees of acceptability.by the same surface structure well-formedness 
constraint that appl:i'.es to sentences like (6)-(8). We will return to 
the derivation of seritences·like those in (5) in Part II. 
2.2. So far we have been considering only sentences in which the  
dislocated noun phra~e is a full noun. It may, however, also be a  
!. 
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pronoun, as illustrated by t}?.e !(a) sentences below• 
. (J,O) a. Me/~self, I never a.riilk beer. 
b. *I I .never drink -beer.'? ' . ' 
(11) a. Him, he never does anything right. 
b. ;,He, he 	never does anything right, 
(12) a. 
b. 
You and me, we ought t9 get together some time. 
You and I, we ought to:get together some time. 
(13) a. Them, I know they'll never believe me. 
b. *They, I know they'll never believe me. 
; ,1 . 
As these examples show, a dislocated pronoun must be an objective 
form, even though the corresponding pronoun in the main sentence is 
in"subject position. , In an extraction ana~ysis, a special lexical 
rule would be required to replace the non-objective pronouns by 
corresponding objective forms, since a lef~ dislocation rule would 
produce the ungrammatical (b} sentences in (10)-(13). 
If the pronoun in the main sentence is in object position, and 
hence the same form as the dislocated pronqun, the resulting sentence 
is awkward in the same way as the sentence~ in (5}, Though here too 
the sentence bec1mes somewhat mpre acceptaqle with a precedin9 about phrase. 
(14} ?(As for} me, no one inviteJ me.  
(15)??(As for} him, r: don't like him.  
(16} ?(Concerning) her, I don't think we should call her  
anYll).ore. 
Note also that these sentences sound better' in fast speech, e.g. when 
xhe initial h, in him and her is elided. Thus, the same surface 
structure well-formedness7onstraint that applies to sentences like 
those in (5) will assign variou's levels of acceptability to sentences 
like (14)-(16) where the dislocated pronoun and the pronoun in the 
matrix sentence are of the same form. 
Notice that a condition against disloc~tion of object pronouns 
would clearly be too strong, not only because (14)-(16) are not totally 
unacceptable but be~ause it would block acdiptable sentences like 
(11) 	a. You and me, ;I don't think they'll be able to get
along without us. 
b. You and her,. no one will believe you anymore. 
Note also that with the pronouns it and you:which have only one form, 
there is no difference in acceptability between sentences in which the 
pronoun in the matrix sentence :is in subjec~ position and sentences in 
which it is in object position ,i another indication that it is the 
identity of the two forms and tiot the synta6tic position of the pronoun 
that is responsible for the difference in a~ceptability between (10)-
(13) and (14)-(16). 
(18) You, 	 you can gq tomorrow. 
(19) You, 	we'll let you go tomorrow. 
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(2Q) 	 It,. I ju~t can't ~der~tand it. 
(21) 	 lt, it nev~r seems to.work right anymore. 
The unacc~ptability of (20) and (21) ,indicates that the pronoun it 
can not be left dislocated.4 In an extraction analysis (EH) an ad hoc 
restriction woul~ thus have to be placed on the left dislocation rule 
, I 	 in .order to prev~nt it from applying to this pronoun. The facts would 
follow naturally, howevet, from LSH. The pronoun it cannot be generated 
in l'eft dislocated position·~ since it is necessarily anaphoric. qompare, 
(20' ) and {21 1 ) , where has been replaced by that. 
(20 1 ) ?That, I just can't understand it. 
(21 1 ) ?That, it never seems to work right anymore. 
Note also that it is equally less acceptable than other pronouns in 
a what about oras for {concerning, etc.) phrase. Thus, compare 
' 
(22) 	 What .about her?  
What about him?  
What about you?  
What about me?  
What about them?  
What about that?  
??What about it?' -' 
As for her ••• 
As for him•.. 
As for you••. 
As for me ••• 
As for them.,. 
As for that .•• 
??As for it ••• 
3. On the Function of the Dislocated Noun Phrase and Its Relationship 
to the Rest of the Sentence. 
There are a number of facts which suggest that the function of the 
left dislocated noun phrase is to state the theme of the following 
predicative sentence--to indicate what the sentence is about. Let us 
designate this function as that of topic and the predicative element, 
i.e., the remainder of the sentence, as comment. 
3.1. The disiocated noun phrase may be.preceded by as for, concerning 
or about. Thus, the following sentences are paraphrases of (la)-(lJ) 
respectively. 
(23) a. About this room, it really depresses me. 
j 
b. As for women, I'll never be able to figure·them out. 
c. 	 Concerning this spot in the rug, you better get it 
out before the party on Saturday. 
d. 	 Concerning 1;he new Kubrick Movie, Bill said Marvin 
told him it was great. 
e. 	 About your second chapter, I haven't gott~n around 
to it yet. 
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A question with a dislocated noun phrase maybe para.phrased by a 
sentence where the dislocated·noifu.phrase is preceded by what a.bout. 
Thus (23f) and (23g) are paraphrases of (lg) and (lh) respectively. 
(2~) 	 f .. What about·.your cousin J?.gnes,. is she coming; 
g. 	 What about those slacks I I got you for your 
,birthday, can yo.u stiil fit into them. 
; 	 i • 
In general a dislocated sentence1-li.thout a preceding about5 
element always has a ciorresponding.paraphrase with such an element, 
though the reverse is not always:true, i.e~~ in some cases a dislocated 
noun phrase must be preceded by about, conc~rning, or as for. These 
cases will be pointed out below •. In order to account for the sentences 
where the dislocated noun phrase; is preceded by an about element, we 
might propose a rule which optionally (in sqme cases obligatorily) 
places such· an element in front bf NP1. Alternatively, it m:ight be 
assumed that the about element (or some primitive ~m meaning roughly· 
'about') is already present in the logical $tructure. The latter 
alternative seems particulaTly attractive ~ince the predicate about 
eA-plicitly·represents the function of the dislocated NP with respect 
to the rest of the sentence. An· interesting possibility, it seems to 
me, is that'an about phrase containing the'd,islocated NP is actually 
part of the performative clause,6 i.e., the .logical structure of (la) 
is roughly (24). 
(24) S 
~ 
NP VP 
I ~ 
I V NP NP NP 
I ~ I 
you about NP1 S 
~ 
NP . S 
'· I ~ 
x1: 	 this x really depresses 
room me 
Unfortunately I am aware of no ~trong evidence in favor of such a 
hypothesis at present and I do not have time: to investigate it any 
further here. One :fact which may argue against such a hypothesis 
is that dislocation is sometimes possible in subordinate clauses (see 
section 8 below), though it will be noted that it is ~eneraliy 
restricted to subordinate clauses that are objects of verbs which 
can 	take an about clause. 
3.2. · A left-dislocated se~tence which is not itself a question always 
answers some implicit or explic.it question: What about x?, where x 
is the dislocated NP. Thus, fo'r example, (la)-(le) are appropriate 
responses to the respective que;stions: What about this room, women, 
this spot in the rug, the new Kubrick movie, and m;y: second chapter. 
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3~3~ 	 :I have argued }n G.undel (1974) that the element .which represents 
what the sentence is' about (the topic).: never carries the p:i:-imary streis 
in the sen:tence. In English, and possibly: in .a.ii natural languages; 
the constituent with primary stress always repte;ents the .n~w information 
in thl:!. sentence, that which is being predicated about tpe topic.7 That 
nei~her 	a dislocated noun phi;-ase no.r the corresponding pronoun in the 
matrix sentence can receive primary stress is witnessed by the ungramma.-
. ticality of th.e following sentence.s. 
(25} 	 a. *This room, it really depresses me. 
b. *This room, it really depresses me. 
(26) a. *Women, I~llnever be able to figure them out. 
b. *Women-,· I 111 never be able to figure them out. 
(27) 	 a. .;;Your second chapter, I haven't gottenar'"ound to 
.reading it yet. 
b, 	*Your second chapter, I haven't gotten around to 
reading it yet. 
(28) 	 a. *Your new haircut, I really like it. 
b. ,;Your new haircut, I really like 
(29) . 	a. *Him he never doe.s anything right. 
b. *Him, he never does anything right. 
In order to account for these facts, I propose a rule of stress 
placement whic_h may be stated informally as follows: 
(30) 	 stress placement--assigns primary stress·to the 
rightmost non-variable element in S. 
(This rule naturally must apply before the rule that replaces the variable 
by a pronominal form.) At present the most widely accepted theory of 
sentence stress assumes that .there are two separate rules of stress 
placement. The first of these--which assigns the 'normai" stress 
pattern--assigns primary stress to the rightmost element in S with 
special conditions that would prevent the-rule from apply1ng to 
pronominal forms and possibly other elements as well. A later rule of 
emphatic stress placement optionally assigns 'emphatic' stress .to any 
element in the sentence, The inadequacy·of such an analysis has recently 
been pointed out in works by Susan Schmerling (cf., for example, 
Schinerling (1974)}. One of the problems is the sometimes counter-
intuitive prediction as to what constitutes 'normal' as opposed to 
'emphatic' stress. Iri EH it would be necessary depending on the order 
of rules to either (a) place a special condition on emphatic stress place-
ment which would prevent it from applying to dislocated noun phrases artd 
pronominal remnants of such phrases in the.matrix sentence, or (b) place 
a special condit·ion on left dislo.cation which would prevent it from 
applying to primary stres,sed elements. Either way. the relation between 
topic-comment structure an·d sentence stress is treated as an accident. 
I. will argue in Part that if topic-connnent structure is explicitly 
represented in logical structure, namely by structures like (4), it will 
be possible to predict. the ·str.ess pattern of all sentences by ( 30) , thus 
eliminating the need. for a special rule of emphatic stress placement. 
Such an analysis also c~ptures more directly the relationship between 
sentence stress and the topic-comment structure of the sentence. 
----------
---------
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3.4. 
faa) , 
Summing up what has been proposed so 
for example, roughly as follows : 
far, the derivation of 
1. s -----------
x1: 
NP1 
I 
women 
S' 
~ 
I'll never be able to 
figure x out 
stress placement 
2. S 
S 1NP1 
I ~----
x1: women I'll never be able to figure 
x out 
+stress 
feature copyine5 
8 1NP1 
3, 
------
s-----
I .c:::::::=====-===== x1 : women I'll never be able to figure 
x out 
+pl. 
+fem. 
pronominalization 
4. s 
NP1 S' 
l ..,::::::::::::::::::===========--women I'll never be able to figure them 
out. 
4. On the Nature of the Dislocated Noun Phrase. 
The strongest argument in favor of LSH comes, I believe, from 
restrictions on the kinds of noun phrases which may be dislocated. 
4.1. Left Dislocation and specificity. Consider the following sentences. 
(31) Gwendolyn would like to marry an honest politician. 
(32) He didn't charge me for a phone call. 
(33) The proofreader didn't see a misprint. 
Sentences (31)-(33) are systematically ambiguous with respect to. 
whether or not the speaker commits himself to a belief in the existence 
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of some specific individual or obje~t designated by. the indefinite  
noun phrase. This point is illustrated :by the fact that ( 31 ):- ( 33}  
may be foilowed by either the (a) or the (b) senten.ces in (34)-(36)  
res)?~ctively. : ·  
(34) 	 a. His name is Percy Goodfellow. 
b. But she hasn't been able to find one. 
(35) 	 a. It was the one I made to Beirut. 
b •. He insisted 6n paying for them all himself, 
(36) 	 a. It was the: one on page ninety. 
b. Your typing must be pretty good. 
The reading which may be followed by t.he (a) sentences can be  
paraphrased by (37)-(39) respectively, .the reading which may be  
followed by the (b) sentences cannot.  
{37) There'a an honest politician that Alice would like 
to marry. 
(38) 	 Ther~ was a phone call that he 'didn't charge me 
for. 1 
(39) 	 There was a mispri~t that the proofreader didn't 
see, 
The left dislocated sentences which correspond to {31)-(33) 
have some interesting properties. Dislocation of the indefinite noun 
phrase results in ungrammaticality if the corresponding pronoun in the 
matrix sentence is definite. 
(40) 	*(As for) an honest politician, Gwendolyn wants to 
marry him.· 
{41) 	 *(Concerning) a phone call, he didn't charge me for 
it. 
(42) *(About) a misprint, the proofreader didn't see it. 
The ungrammaticality of sentences like (40)-(42)has led some autgors 
to cl~im the dislocation cannot apply to indefinite noun phrases. 
Note, however, that dislocation of the indefinite noun phrase is 
· possible if the corresponding pronoun in the matrix sentence is one. 
{43) {As for) an honest politician, Gwendolyn would 
like to marry one. 
(44) 	 (As for) a phone call, he didn't charge me for one. 
(45) 	 (As for) a misprint, the proofreader didn't see one. 
The pronoun ~ in these sentences, like the indefinite noun phrase 
in the non-dislocated counterpart, can have a specific as well as a 
non-specific reading, as can be seen by following {43)-(45) by either 
the (a) sentences or the (b) sentences in (34)-(36). 
{43) a. (As for) an honest politician, Gwendolyn would 
like to marry one. Hi.s name is Percy Goodfellow. 
b. 	 (As for) an honest politician, Gwendolyn would 
like.to marry one; but she hasn't been able 
to find ont. 
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(44) 	 .a;.· (As for) a phone call, he 'didri.'t charge me· 
for one; it was the one I made ·to Beirut .. 
b. 	 (As·for) a phope call i· he didn 1t charge· llle 
for one, he ,insisted on paying for them ail 
himself. I 
(45) 	 a. (As for) a misprint, the proofreader didri't 
see one, it :was· the one on page· ninety. 
I b. (As for) a misprint, the proofreader didn '.t 
\.. 
see one; yoiµ- typing must be pretty goqd. 
However, while the pronoun one may be interpreted either speci-
fically or nonspecifically, the dislocated indefinite noun phrase cannot 
have a specific indefinite reading. This is indicated first o'f all by 
the fact that the c·orresponding p:rionoun in the matrix sentence cannot 
be definite, as witnessed by the ungrammaticality of (40)-(42). The 
antecedent of a singular definite,pronoun can only have a singular 
specific reference. Thus, compare: 
(46) 	 a. Henrietta would like to go out with a fampus 
juggler; but he won't have anything to ~o 
with her; 
b. 	 Henrietta would like to go out with a famous 
juggler; but _its hard to find one these, days. 
Specific noun phrases may be preceded by determiners like a certain, 
a particular, non-sl)ecific noun phrases may not·, as witnessed by the 
following examples. 
(41) 	 a. I·can't find a certain bottle of Scotch. It's 
the one your cousin brought over last night. 
b. 	i,r can't find a certain bottle of Scotch; you must 
have' forgotten to buy some. 
(48) 	 a. t1ga wants to marry a certain Norwegian; his 
n8Jlle is Swen Swenson~ 
b. 	*Olga wants to marry a certain Norwegian; but 
she hasn I t .been able to find one. 
A dislocated indefinite noun phrase can n~ver be preceded by_determiners 
like ·a certain, a particular, regardless of the interpretation of the 
pronoun one in the matrix sentence. 
(49) 	 a. (As for) a bqttle of Scotch, I haven't been 
able to find one; its the one your cousin 
brought over last night . . 
b. 	*(As.for) a certain bottle of Scotch, I haven't 
been able to find one; its the one your cousin 
brought over last night. 
(50) 	 a. (As:for) a Norwegian, Alice would like to.marry 
one; his name is Swen Swenson. 
b. 	*(As for) a certain Norwegian, Alice would:like to 
marry one;, his name is Swen Swenson. · 
I 
A spec'ific indefinite no1µ1 phras~ may l:)e followed by a non-restrictive 
re:J..ative clause; a non'-specific inde:f:i.nite generally may not.9 Thus. 
compare 
(51) 	 a. Wanda.would like to ~rry a Frenchman, whose 
:name is Jacques, but he hasn't proposed to 
her yet. · 
b. 	*Wanda would like to marry a Frenchman~ whose 
name is Jacques; but she hasn't. been able to 
find one. 
(52) 	 a. I'm looking for a dress, which is pink with 
white stripes; it was hanging in the closet 
this morning. 
b. 	-~I'm looking for a dress, which is pink with 
white stripes; but I haven't been able to find 
pne that fits. 
That a dislocated indefinite noun phrase cannot be followed by non-
restrictive relative clause is illustrated by the following examples. 
(53) 	 a. (As for) a Frenchman, Wanda would like to marry 
one; but he hasn't proposed to her yet. 
b. 	*(As for). a Frenchman, whose name is Jacques, 
Wan4a.~ould like to marry one; but he hasn't 
proposed to her yet. 
(54) 	 a. (As for} a dress, I'm looking for one; it was 
hanging in the closet this morning. 
b. 	*(As for) a dre$s, which is pink with white 
stripes, I'm looking for one; ·it was hanging 
in the closet this morning. 
Npn-specific indefinite noun phrases share properties with generic , 
plural~ and in many instanc·es the former may be replaced by the latter 
without any significant change in meaning.10. Compare, for example 
(55) 	 a. A.turtie makes a great pet. 
b. Turtles 	make great p'ets. 
(56) 	 a. Henrietta refuses to date a linguist. 
b. Henrietta refuses to date linguists. 
(57) 	 a. He didn't charge me for a drink. 
b. He didn''t charge me for (any) drinks.', . 
That this is not the case for specific indefinites11 is. demonstrated 
by the following examples., 
(58) 	 a. He didn't charge us for a drink; it was the 
gin and tonic. 
b. 	*He didn't charge us f'or (any) drinks; it was 
the gin and tonic. 
(59) 	 a. Henrietta refuses to date a linguist; his name 
is Bill Turner~ 
b. 	*Henrietta refuses to date linguists; his naJne 
is Bill Turner. 
J 
.. ·--- --- - ---~-·-----·-·-------·---·------ . .. .. 
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Left dislocated noun.phrases :may ,be replaced by the correspop.ding 
. gerieric regardless ;of whether the pronoun one in the _matrix -sentence 
is specific or non-specific.· In ·most case~the sentence sounds 
better if the dislocated noun phrase is preceded PY as for (about,
etc.). 12 	 ----
(60) 	 a. (Concerning) 'turtles, a turtle makes a great 
pet. 
b. (Concerning) turtles , Bill .has one. 
(61) 	 a. (As for) linguists, Henrietta refuses to date 
I 
one because 	she thinks they are all degenerate. 
b. 	 (As for) linguists, Henrietta refuses to date 
one; his name is Bill Turner. 
(62) 	 a. (About) drinks, he didn't charge us for one; 
they were all on the house. 
b. 	 (About) drinks, he didn't charge us for one; 
it was the'.gin and tonic. 
It has been suggested that the way to account for the ambiguity 
of sentences like (31)-(33) is by the position of the existential 
quantifier in the underlying (semantic) representation. Thus, the 
specific and nori~spe~ific readings of (31) would be distinguished by 
the fact that in the underlying representation of the former the whole 
sentence is in the scope of the existential quantifier, while in the 
latter it is not ..The two representations would correspond roughly to 
(31' ) 	and ( 31 11 ) respectively. 
(31
(31') Ex (x is an honest politiciM and Gwendolyn would 
like to marry x)l3 
11 
) Gwendolyn would like Ex (xis an honest politician 
and Gwendolyn·marries x) 
In (33) the distinction would lie in the fact that the negative is 
within the scope of the existential ~uantifier bn the specific reading, 
but the existential quantifier is within the scope of the negative on 
the non-specific reading. Thus, 1 the two interpretations would 
correspond roughly to (33') and (33") respectively. 
(33') Ex (xis a misprint and the proofreader didn't 
see x) 
(33 11 ) Not Ex (xis a ;misprint and the proofreader saw x) 
We may thus 	represent the logical structures of the two readings of 
(43) and (4 5) roughly as follows'.: 
(43') 	 s-----~-----.:......:___ 
.N~l i ~- =-
Yl: honest politicians Ex (xis a y and Gwendolyn 
would like to marry x)l4 
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(43,, ) s 
s 
·~ 
Gwendolyn would like Ex 
(xis a y and Gwendolyn 
marries .x) 
. 
I 
1 
-=:::::::::::::========-=-y1 ; misprints Ex (xis a y and not the 
proofreader saw x) 
(45") s 
( 45') 
NP. s 
sNP1I . ~ 
y1 : ?1isprints Not Ex (xis a y and the 
proofreader saw x) 
Whether or not this particular solution for distinguishing the  
specific and non-specific readings of indefinite noun phrases turns  
out to be correct,15 it is clear that on the specific reading the  
speaker.asserts his belief in the existence of a particular object or  
individual referred to by the indefinite noun phrase while on the non- 
specific reading this is not the case; the speaker either explicitly  
denies the existence of a particular object or individual or makes no  
commitment one way or the other. Whatever the ~orrect solution turns  
.out to be the above facts concerning non-specificity of dislocated 
indefinites (more correctly they don't to a specific object--
they do of course refer tq a specific class of objects) would require 
some ad hoc explanation under the extraction analysis. It would be 
necessary to place a, condition on the left dislocation rule requiring 
that this rUle cannot apply to a specific indefinite, assuming of course 
that this is even possible, i.e., it is not clear how such a condition 
could be stated unless specificity is considered a feature on the noun. 
Moreover, such a condition would be too strong. As was demonstrated 
above, though the dislocated noun phrase is non-specific, its pronominal 
remnant ~may have a specific interpretation. On the other hand, 
these facts f'ollow quite naturally from LSH. Assuming that specific · 
indefinites can only be introduced into a proposition by an existential 
quantifier, they woUld automatically be excluded from the position of 
the dislocated noun phrase since this noun phrase originates outside 
the scope of any quantifier. Note also our earlier observation that 
the dislocated noun phrase is the topic of the sentence. Its function 
is to identify the object or set of objects that the sentence is about. 
Moreove~, the existence of the topic noun phrase is not part of what 
is assefted in t4e. sentence; it is presupposed.16 The dislocated noun 
phrase may, however, be gene~ic, i.e., it may identify a particular 
class of individuals. or objects; hence it may have the form of a 
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n6n-specific indefinite, an alternate form for a g_eneric noun :phrase 
(see above) : We would predict, ni6teover, that indefinite noun 
phrases, whether they are specific or nort~specific, cannot be 
dislocated if they have rto'·generic count~rpart. That this is in 
fact the case, is illustrated by:_the foliowii:tg examples: 
(63) a. I would like,to catch one. 
(64) 
b. 
a. 
*{As for) one, I would like to catch one/it. 
Someone is here to see you. 
(65} 
b. 
a. 
-::-(As for} someone, one/he is here to see you. 
I didn't tell anrone about it. 
(66) 
b. 
a. 
*(As for) anyone, I didn't tell one/him about it. 
Nothing can stop him now. 
b. *(As for) nothing, one/it can stop him now. 
Again, in EH these facts would be treated as accidental; special ad 
hoc restrictions would" have to be placed on left dislocation to block 
the (b) sentences in (63)-(66}. : 
4.2. Deep and surface noun phrases. Noun phrases which contain 
quantifier-like determiners generally cannot be dislocated, as witnessed 
by the following examples. 
(67) 	 a. I like on~y John. 
b. *(As for) only John, I like him. 
(68) 	 a. Even Bill wasn't wearing a hat. 
b. *(As for) even Bill, he wasn't wearing a hat. 
(69) 	 a. We saw ]Jl.8.ny monkeys at the zoo. 
b. *(As for) many monkeys, we saw them at the zoo. 
(70) 	 a. Every child was eating a lollipop. 
b. *(As for) every child, he was eating a lollipop. 
(71) 	 a. Few people will understand this thesis. 
b. 	*(As for) few people~ they will understand this 
thesis. 
(72) 	 a. Bill said that. all anthrop_ologists admire Dr. 
Mead. 
b. 	*(As for) all anthropologists, Bill said they 
admire Dr.: Mead. 
(73) 	 a. We interviewed three men yesterday. 
b. *{As for) t~ee men, we interviewe.d them yesterday. 
(74) 	 a. None of the doctors wanted the senator to become 
president •1 
b. {;{As for) none of the doctors, they wanted the 
senator td become president. 
(75} a. I must have'eaten two pounds of candy last night. 
b. 	*(As for) two pounds of candy, I must have eaten 
it last night. 
Note however that with the exception of only and ™;these noun 
phrases can 	be dislocated if the quantifier is left behind.17 Thus 
compare 
(76) 	 (As for) monkeys, we saw many at the zoo. 
--~ -- --- . -----· 
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. (77) : {As for).the .children, every ·one was eating a 
lollipop·. 
(78) 	 (As fo~) people (?) (cf. however chemists), few 
will understahd this thesis. . . 
(79) 	 (As for) anthropologists, Bill said all (ofthein)/ 
they:a.11 admire Dr. Mead, 
(80) 	 (As for) men, we interviewed three yesterday. 
(81) 	 (As for) the doctors, none (of them) wanted the 
senator to become president. 
(82) 	 (As for) candy, I must have eaten two pounds (of 
it) last night. 
Again, an extraction a~alysis would require an ad hoc condition to  
block dislocation of noun phrases which contain quantifiers. But the  
. facts follow automatically from LSH. The quantifiers which cannot be 
dislocated are precisely those which are not part of the noun phrase 
in logical structure. Though the source .of quantifiers is still a 
matter of considerable debate, it is fairly clear that the quantifiers 
in (67 )-{ 75) are not part of the noun phrase in logical structure but 
are introduced into it at some lat.er stage in the de.rivation. Note 
that a sentence, like (73) becomes acceptable if the noun phrase 
containing the quantifier is definite. 
(83) a. We interviewed those three men yesterday. 
b. 	 (As for) those three men, we interviewed. them 
yesterday. 
In (83), the quantifier three is an identifying property of the noun  
phrase in which it is contained, in (73) it is· not.  
It should be mentioned, however, that the situation is not as 
clear cut as.the above facts would indicate. Some quantifier noun 
phrases can be dislocated out of subject position. This is particularly 
true for the quantifier~. but also to some extent for many, all 
and most. Thus; compare 
(84) 	 a. Some people can·1 t do anything right. 
b. Some people, they can't do anything right. 
(85) 	 a, Many monkeys refuse to eat bananas. 
b. ?Many monkeys, they refuse to eat bananas. 
(86) a. Most Italians eat spaghetti as an appetizer. 
b. 	?Most Italians, they eat spaghetti as an 
appetizer. 
(87) 	 a. All violators will be prosecuted. 
b.??All violators, they will be prosecuted. 
In order to account for the possible grammaticality of the {b)  
sentences in (84)-(86) I will assume for the present that there is  
a rule which optionally moves certain quantifiers from.subject  
position into position before the dislocated noun phrase. Thus, for  
example, (85b) would be derived by such a rule from the structure in  
(85b I),  
s 
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m~at 
' bananas 
where X in S' is realized as they :if the quantifier movement rule 
applies, but the result is {85b") if it does not. 
(85) 	 b". (As -for) monkeys, i:9any of them refuse to eat 
bananas.· 
Note th,;.t { 85b") is a paraphras~ of (85b). 
Such Wl analysis, even if it turns out·to be correct, is admittedly 
not a very sa,tls:t'ying explanation for the facts in (84 );.. (87), but I 
have no better solµtion to propose at present~ In a:p.y case, the 
situation is equally as problematic for the extraction analysis; at 
least LSH is able to account for some of th,e facts in a. principled .ray. 
5. Left Dislocated Sentences with No Non-dislocated Counterpart. 
We have seen that the left dislocated ·noun phrase need not be 
coreferential with the corresponding pronoun in si, since this pronoun 
may refer only to a subset of the obj~ct refereed to by NP1, as in the 
case where NP1 is gen,eric and the pronoun in the matrix sentence is 
~ {specific or non-specific). Actually, it ~s possible _that the 
dislocated noun phrase has. no c'orresponding pronoun in ·the matrix 
sentence at all; as in the following ex!'l,lllples: 
(88) a. As for frui,t, Jim likes cantelopes best. 
b. 	 As for the ;weather, I think it will rain 
tomorrow. 
c. 	 As for the democratic nomination, I don't think 
Mayor Sensenbrenner has a chance, 
d. 	 A's for Paris, the Eiffel Tower is really 
spectacular. 
Unless one is willing to accept completely different analyses 
for left dislocated sentences and sentences with prefixed about 
elements, thus ignoring obviou~ similarities between the two, sentences 
like those in (88) are crucial.examples against the extraction.analysis 
for left dislocated sentences ~ince they have no non-dislocated 
counterpart out of which the noun phrase could have been movea.18 
These facts provide no problem, however, for LSH. Since the 
dislocated NP does not originate in the main sentence, it is not 
necessary that this sentence contain a coreferent of the d.islocated 
NP. However, given the dislocated NP's function in naming vhat the 
following clause is· about, it necessary that t;here be some meaningful 
connection between the two, i.e. that the clause-be a meaningful 
predication about the.dislocated NP. This principle, which I propose 
as a well-formedness condition on semantic (logical) structures may be 
stated roughly as in {89) {note that (89) is similar to one of the 
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rules 	e>f successful .predic;:ation pr6posed. iri Searle. (1969 :126)). 
(89) 	 In order for a comment; c5, to be· successfully 
• 	 predicated of a topic, ·T, T must be of a type 
or category such that.it is logically possible 
for C. te> be tru~ or false of T·. 
The principle stated. in (89) would correctly predict the unacceptability 
of sentences like those in (90). (In fact, I wi:).-1 attempt to ·demonstrate 
in section 6.3 below that (89) has much wider application in the grammar 
that goes far beyond assuring the well formednes·s of left dislocated 
constn,i.ctions). · 
(90) 	 a. "As for fruit, Jim likes red snapper best. 
I
b. *As for the weather, Pricilla loves Tom. 
c, 	*As for the Democratic nomination, the A's 
· beat the Mets. 
d. 	 ·:fAs !for Cleveland, the Eiffel Tower is 
spectacular. 
Note that in (88a) the ~at:dx sentence does in fact contain a poun 
phrase (cantelope) which is a subset of the set of objects referred 
to by the dislocated noun phrase (fruit). In all the examples in 
(88) it is possible to 9onstruct a sentence which relates NP1 to S'; 
· these· are, respectively::
1; 
(88) a I. Cantelope is ·a fruit. 
b'. Ratn is a type of weather. 
CI• Mayor Sensenbrenner may be considered for 
the Democratic nomination. 
d'. The Eiffel Tower is in Pari.s. 
This is not 	possibl~, however, for the examples in (90) .. 
6. Left Dislocation and the Coordinate Structure Constraint.. 
Ross (1967) noticed that left dislocation does not obey his 
proposed constraints on movement transformations. That left dislocation 
does not obey the Complex Noun Phrase Constraint (C.NPC), 19 ~he 
Sentential Subject Constraint· (SSC)20 and the Left Branch Condition 
(LBC)21 :ts witnessed by,the grammaticality of the (c) sentences in 
( 91 )-( 93) respectively., i as compared to the ungrammaticality of the 
corresponding (b) sentence; where another alleged movement rule, 
topicalization, has applied. 
(91) 	 a. The: man who made that proposal must have 
been crazy. 
b... *That proposal the man who made must have 
been crazy. 
c. 	 That proposal, the man who made it must have 
been crazy. 
(92) 	 a. That Henry likes girls is. obvious. 
b. *Girls that Henry likes is obvious. 
c. Gir:ls, that Henry likes them is obvious. 
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(93)· a. Somebody stoie my brother Jim's lawnmower. 
,last night. ' 
b. 	*My brother Jim's so~~body stole lawnmower 
1ast nigh~. · · · ' 
c.. 	My brother Jim, somebody stole q1s lawnmbw~r 
.last. night. 
In order to maintain the generalization that the constraints,4e proposes 
are in fact constraints on niove~ent, Ross suggests that the graIIllllars of 
natural languages contain two types of reordering transformations--
chopping transformations, which ;dQ not leave behind any copy: of- the 
element that has been moved, anq copying transformations,which do leave 
behind a copy of this element. ·only the latter are subject to his 
constraint.cs. 
6.1. However, with respect to one constraint, the Coordinate Structure 
Constraint (csc), stated in (94) below, the claim that copying rules 
are not subject to the constraints appears to .be too strong.: While (95b) 
and (96b), examples of sentences that Ross cited to demonstrate that 
left dislocation does not obey CSC, are indeed acceptable, the (b) 
sentence-:~ in (97) and (98) are not. The ungran'rmaticality of1 (97b) and 
(98b) i~dicates .that in some cases at least left dislocation:_ must be 
subject to CSC, 
(94) 	 Coordinate Structure Constraint. In a Coordinate 
Structure, no conjunct may be moved nor may any 
element contatned in a conjunct be moved o,11t of 
that conjunct: 
(95) 	 a. I hardly ev~r see my father and my mother when 
they're not glaring at each other. 
b. 	 My father, I hardly ever see him and my mother 
when theyi' re not glaring· at each other, 
(96) 	 a. I've sung folksongs.and accompanied myself on 
this guitar all my life. ' 
b. 	 This guitar:, I 1ve sung folksongs and acc,ompanied 
myself on it all my life. 
(97) a. Jim has red: harir ·.and plays the guitar") 
b. *The guitar, Jim has red hair and plays it. 
(98) a. . Jim likes my mother and hates my father•; 
b. *My 	 father, .Jim likes my mother and hate~ him. 
' 
6.2. The assumption th,at there, are two types of movement rules is 
not the only possible solution to the facts in (91)-(93), At least two 
other hypotheses merit consideration. 
1 
i 
(I) 	 Rules that chop •constituents over variables22 in the 
sense of Ross (1967) do not exist. Rules that 
appear to be dhopping rules are actually copying 
rules that leave behind a pronoun which is·later 
deleted. 
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(II) 	 There ar.e. no unbounded movement rules at all;< 
neither chopping rules nor copying rules; 
Constructions which appear to be derived by 
such rules already contain a noµn phrase, x, 
adjoined to a sentence, S, 'in logical structure, 
wh·ere S dominates a noun_ phrase that corresponds 
to x and this noun phrase i:S later optionally--
in some cases obligatorily-~deleted. 
Hypothesis I has been suggested by a nlllD.ber oif authors, 23 most 
recently by Perlmutter (1972). Hypothesis_ II· is the one which is 
being considered in this thesis, though our discussion :i.s l·iinited to· 
only some of the rules in question. 
Both Hypotheses I and II entail that·Ross Constraints are 
constraints not on movement but on deletion, and both receive some 
support from the fact that constructio~s which appear to have been 
derived by a chopping transformation generally have corresponding 
'copied' forms. Sentenc:es which contain a pronomlnal remnant of the 
'preposed' noun phrase are.most common, moreover, in cases where 
deletion of the pronominal form would result in violation of one of. 
the constraints, as illustrated by the following examples. 
(99) 	 a. The girl who Harry believes the claim that 
she planted the bomb wap arrested this 
morning. 
·b. 	 *The :girl who Harry believes the claim that 
planted the bomb was arrested this morning. 
(100) 	 a. The only one who I can ever remember her name 
is Buttons. 
b. 	*The only one who(se) I can ever remember name 
is Buttons . 
• 	(101) a. Jones is the type of guy who you can't help 
but like him once you get to know him. 
b. 	?Jones is the type of guy who you can't help 
but like. once you get to know. 
(102) 	 a. Which·book did you say that you had just talked 
to the man who had ordered it. 
b. 	1'Which book did you say that you had just talked 
to the man who had ordered, 
(103) 	 a. ?It was the vodka that Bill rejected the claim 
that he had stolen it. 
b. 	*It was the vodka that Bill rejected the claim 
that he had stolen. 
(104) 	 a. None of the students who the papers that they 
submitted .had fewer than 25 footnotes will 
receive an A in the course. 
b. 	*None of the students who the papers that submitted 
bad fewer· than 25 footnotes will receive an · 
A in the course. 
If a pronominal remnant is left behind in a topicalized sentence like 
(105a), another construct ion: allegedly derived by a chopping rule, . 
.... ---.~· ~--- ----~--~-- .----· ·... -----· - --~--- - .. -. - - -
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·the result is -a :1eft dislocated· s·entence like (105b). In Part II 
I will argue 	that-the former· is in fact derived from the latter by 
deletiori of 	the pronominal for~. 
(105) a.. That book,, :t don't think he 111 be able: to read. 
b. 	 That book, t don't think her:ll be able[to read 
it. 
In the p~esent section, I hope to demonstrate that the Coordinate 
Struct·ure Constraint is not a unitary phenomenon, but ·actually 
involves two separate phenomena. One of these is a constratnt on 
deletion and the other is not a syntactic constraint at all., but a 
constrai~t on the semantic relationship between the 'preposed noun 
phrase I a~d the rest Of the sentence• i. e • , a generalization Of the 
principle of successful predication, (89), proposed in the previous 
section. 
6.3. Consider the following examples, where the (b) sentences all  
involve a violation of CSC.  
I (106) 	 a. I never r~ad The Godfather and Love Story. 
b~ *The Godfather, I never read and Love Story. 
(107) a. I just saw your brother and his wife. 
b. ;,Your brotQer,·I just saw ~nd his wife.· 
(108) a. John invited Mary and my friend Beatrice.. 
b, 	*The girl who John invited Mary and is my 
friend Beatrice. 
(109) a·. That vase;and this one are both antiques. 
b. *It is that vase which and this one are:both 
antiques. 
II (110) a. Pietro bought the Ferrari and Sofia adores him. 
b. 	 ;,The Ferrari which Pietro bought and Sofia 
adores him was stolen. . 
·(111) 	 a. Bill took;the garbage out and Eleanor washed 
· the windows .. 
b. 	*The windows which Bill took the garbage out 
and Eleanor washed are still dirty. 
(112) 	 a. Jim talces.piano lessons and Tom plays the 
flute. 
b. 	t,The flute,, Jim takes piano lessons and. Tom 
plays.·, 
(113) 	 a. Knoblauch won the Democratic nomination and 
the Repµblicans are.running Smith. 
b. 	;,rt is Smith that Knoblauch won the Democratic 
nominat~on and the Republicans are running. 
As the formulation in (94) i'nd'i(fa.tes, the examples handled by the 
Coordinate structure Constraint fall into two separate groups: 
(1) the reordered element is itself a conjunct, and (2) the reordered 
element is contained in a conjunct. 
The first type is illustr,ated by (106) through (109), the second 
type by (110)-(113)~ It seems: to me, moreover, that there is a 
clear distinction in manner and degree of acceptability between the 
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(b) sentenc~s iri the.two.sets·of examples~ The first set :;is much worse 
than the second. Furth~r evidence for this distinctiqn·comes from 
· the :fact that while the sentences iri. the first group are somewhat--
in so~e cases :~onsiderably-~improved when, a pronominal :form of the 
'preposed' noun ·phrase.is·left behind (at least they are brought to 
the .level of acceptability of the second set), no appreciable 
difference in acceptability results in the second set; these sentences 
remain deviant in exactly the same way. Thus, compare · 
(ll4)?*The Godfather, I never.read it and Love Story. 
(115) Your brother, I just saw him and his wife. 
(ll6)?~"The 	girl who John invited Mary and her is my 
:friend Beatrice. 
(117) 	*It is that vase which it and this one are.both 
antiques. 
(118) 	 *The Ferrari which Pietro.bought it and Sofia 
adores him was stolen. 
(119) 	*The windows which Bill took the garbage out and 
Eleanor washed them are still dirty. 
(120) 	*The flute, Jim takes piano lessons and Tom plays 
it. 
(121) 	*It is Smith that Knoblauch won the Democratic 
nomination and tne Republicans are rJ,1.pning him. 
Some very convincirig evidence ·in favor of distinguishing two separate 
coordinate structure constraints, corresponding to the two sets of 
sentences discussed above, is presented in Grosu (1973). Gr6su notes 
that it is necessary in certain deletion rules to constrain the deletion 
of whole 	conjuncts but not of elements within conjuncts, for example, 
in the rule that deletes comparative elements. 
(122) a. ;+Leonid has more cars than Dick has cars. 
b. Leonid has more cars than Dick has. 
(123) 	 a. Leonid has more cars than Dick has cars and 
TV sets. 
b .• *Leonid has more cars than Dick has and TV 
sets. 
(124) 	 .a. Leonid has more cars than Dick has cars or 
than Mao has shirts. 
b •. Leonid has more cars than Dick has or than Mao 
has shirts. 
Thes~ sentences illustrate that the rule of Comparative I?eletion which 
derives the {b} sentences from the {a) sentences in (122)-(124) must 
be prevented :from applying to whole conjuncts as· in (123b) but at the 
same time must be allowed to apply to elements within conjuncts, as in· 
(124b). 
What these facts suggest is that the data handled by Ross' 
Coordinate Structure Constraint actually involve two separate prin~iples. 
The first (like CNPC, SSC and LBC) depends crucially on the total 
deletion of elements in certain environments, in this case the deletion 
of one of the members of a conjunction--more specifically one of the 
93 
. ,. 
conjuncts to th.~ right or to the :left ·or and. The second one does 
not involve 	deletion ~t ~ll. •· Not only are deletion rules not subject 
to a constraint on deleU:o_n of elements within conjuncts, but -the 
ungrammaticality of (97b) and (9eb) and the ungrammatical sentences  
. in (114 )-(121) show that copying :ruJ.es are subject• to some constraint  
on elements_within QOnjuncts, - -
The grammaticality of (115) and (95b) as· opposed to the 
ungrammaticality of (107b) and (125), (I repeat the sentences here for 
convenience), shows that· a s~ntence where the deleted noun phrase is 
a conjunct may become ~cceptable _if a copy of the pronoun is left 
behind. 	 · ' 
(107) b, ;;Your brother, I just saw and his wife. 
(115) Your 	brother, I ,just saw him and his wife, 
(125) 	*My father I hardly ever see and my mother when 
they're not glaring at each other. 
(95) 	 b, My father, I hardly ever see him and my 
mother when they're not drunk. 
On the other hand, examples like 'the (b) sentences tn (110)-(113) 
where the deleted element is inside_ a conjunct always remain 
unacceptable even when there is a pronominal remnant of the 'preposed' 
noun phrase inside the conjunct, .as illustrated by (118 )-(121). 
Moreover, deletion of a·noun phrase inside a conjunction in cases where 
it appears that a chopping rule has applied does not necessariiy result 
·in ungrammaticality, and it is just in those cas~s when the corresponding 
'copying' construction'is acceptable as well. Qompa.re for example 
(126) and (96b), one of the sentences that Ross cited to show that 
copyi~g rules are not _subject to'CSC. 
(126) 	 This guitar I've sung folksongs and accompanied 
myself on· all·my life. 
(96) 	 b. This guitar, I've sung folksongs and accompanied 
myself on;it all my life. 
Note that the degree.to which the presence of a pronoun- form 
in sentences like (114)-(117) improves the sentence in relation to the 
corresponding construction where'the pronoun has been deleted depends 
on whether or not the 11preposed".noun phrase has some semantic 
connection with both conjuncts. Thus, (115) and (95b), where the 
conjunction and is int~rpreted ih a joint sense, i.e., and is interpreted 
as with, are fully acceptable. Compare, however, (114), (116) and (117) 
where and cannot have a joint interpretation and where, consequently, 
the sentence remains unacceptabl~ in spite of the presence'of the 
pronoun form. Similarly, (126) and (96b) both conjuncts have some 
semantic connection with the preposed noun phrase; but in (118)-(121) 
one of the conjuncts has nothing to do with the 1preposed' noun phrase 
at all. 
On the basis of the above t:acts, I propose that the· Coordinate 
Structure Const~aint has reformulated as two separate principles--one 
a surface structure constraint and the other a semantic well-formedness 
condition. . They may be stated r'oughly as follows: · 
. (12T) · Conjunct Delet ion Constraint: (cr,c) . Surface . 
Structures of the type 
A 
~ 
·. B and C 
where either 	B. or C is null are ili-formed 
(128) 	 A noun phrase, x, that is adjoined to a sentence, 
S, must be semantically relevant to any sentence, 
S' , that is immediately dominated by S, i.e. , 
S' must be a meaningful predication about x. 
Notice that (128) is just a inore \general statement of (89), the well-
·formedness condition ~on the relationship between the topic and the 
comment in logical structure that was stated at the end of the last 
section. 
6.4. Specific proposals in this part have been restricted to the 
derivation of left dislocated sentences. To show that in other 
constructions subject to CSC, namely questions,·cleft sentences and 
relative clauses, (128) is a condition on the top~c-cornment relation-
ship in logical structure, it is necessary to make a nwnber of 
assumptions, most of which I am not prepared to justify here. These 
may be briefly summarized as follows. 
(I) 	 cteft sentences (as well as corresponding pseudo-
cleft sentences) are derived from underlying 
equative structures where the topic is a 
descriptive noun phrase. The underlying 
structure of (113b) is thus roughly (113b'). 
I repeat (113b) here for convenience. 
(113) 	 b. It is Smith that Knoblauch won the Democratic 
nomination and the Republicans are running. 
(113) 	 b'. S 
NP 	 s__________,_ ~ 
NP 	 S x be Smith 
I 	 ------.,----_ 
x 	 S and~ ~ ~--·---,----
Knoblauch won the The Repubiicans 
Democrati'c are running x 
nomination 
(II) 	The derivation of wh-questions is similar to that of 
cleft and pseudo-cleft sentences, 'i.e. , these too 
are derived from equative structures like (113b'). 
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(IiI) The sentence embedded inside a relative claµ.se 
:has a topic..;comment structure where. moreover; 
the tol)ic .is necessarily coref'ere11tial w;ith the 
head of the .clause. The logical structure of' 
(lllb), irrel~vant 4etails (including topic-
comment structure of the highest sentence) 
omitted, is thus roughly (lllb'), · (lllb) is 
repeated here for cbnvenience. 
(111) 	 b. The windows which Bill took the garbage out 
and Eleanor washed are still dirty. 
(111) b'. 	 S 
NP VP ~ 	I
NP S are still 
1·~ dirty 
the windows NP1 S 
'.I ~ 
x1 the windows S s . I 	 I 
Bill took Eleanor washed· 
the garbage X 
out 
If such a hypothesis turns out to be correct, it eliminates the need 
f'or a rule that moves relative pronouns to the f'ront of the sentence, 
since the noun phrase that is relativized, the topic, is already in 
its surface structure position.· This analysis also accounts for the 
fact that a pronoun copy of the·relative pronoun may (and in some 
languages must) be present in t~e embedded sentence. 
If assumptions I and II are accepted, then the semantic relation-
ship in question in cleft sentences and questions is not between the 
clefted noun phrase (which I argued in Gundel (1974) is never the 
topic) or the question word and the rest of the sentence but between 
the head of a relative clause and the sentence embedded inside that 
clause, more specifically betwe~n the topic and comment of the sentepce 
embedded inside a relative clause. Even if III.cannot be maintained 
it is necessary to account for the f'act that a structure like (129) 
cannot underlie any well-formed. sentence iri English. 
(129~ 	 s 
NP~------. VP 
~ 	I 
NP 	 S are still dirty 
I 	 1 
the windows :George took the 
garbage out 
The analysis 	which I am proposing here makes the claim that (lllb) 
and (129) are ill-formed for the same reason. A theory that acc9unts 
for the ungrammaticality of (lllb) by CSC, i.e.~ by the constraint 
formulated. in.{ 94 ) treats. these two facts. being completely 
unre+ated • 
.	6. 5,. If CSC. is reformulated as the two se:para.te constraints in 
{127) and (i28) we ~ould predict that constructions that appear to 
have:l;leen derived by a chopping rule where the preposed noun phrase 
originates inside a conjunct but is in some way relevant to both 
members of the conjunctiqn will not be ungrammatical. This was 
already illustrated by tµe grammaticality of (126) above. It is 
the case also with ·so-caU.ed asymmetric conjunctions like (130)-(133), 
which pose a problem for Ross' theory. 
(130) It was the bread which Jim went to the store 
and picked up. 
(131) What di~ Mary go to Paris and take several 
pictures of. 
(132) The guitar which Jim saved ~50 and bought was 
a Yamaha. 
(133) The arm which Mary went skiing and broke ha.s-
healed remarkably ,.,ell. 
These sentences are acceptable because Jim's going to the store, 
Mary's going to Paris, Ji~'s saving $5,0, and Mary's going skiing are 
interpreted as having something to do with the bread, something tqat 
Mary took pictures of, the guitar and Mary's arm respectively! 
At the end of Chapter 6, Ross (i967) notes some facts which 
pose a problem for CSC. It is generally assumed that the correct 
analy~is of appositive cla~ses (restrictive r~lative clause$) is that 
they are derived from conjoined structures by a rule that inserts 
the second conjunct.into the first. Thus, the structure underlying 
(134) is 	derived from (134'). 
(134) 	 Professor Allerwissen, whom I've always admired, 
is giving a talk on nasalizaton tonight. 
81 82 
~=-==-=========-== I've always admiredProf. A is giving a 
talk on nasalization Prof. A. 
tonight 
But the rule which is resnonsible for the derivation of (134} from 
(134') would violate CSC.- If my reinterpretation of the fact~ is 
correct·, however, no problem arises with respect _to this· rule 
because it violates neither (127) nor (128), i.e., it does not 
result in a surface structure like.· 
A ' 
~
B and C 
·-~--------- ·-· . . 
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where either A or B.is null, 'nor iioes it violate a well-for~~d.ness 
condition on the semantic ·realtiohship between a noun: phrase 'and an 
adjoined sentence in logical structure~ 
7~ An Alternative .. Solution 
I have proposed herE! that left dislocated noun: phrases are. not 
moved into their surface· structure position by a .copying· rule but are, 
rather, already gener.ated in that position in the base. It was· argued 
. that certain ·properties of dislocated noun phrases.:..:..(a) they :cannot 
be specific indefinites, {b) they cannot contain a quantifier·, (c) 
their function is to name-what. the following sentence (and ·any sentence 
immediately dominated by it) is about, (d) they cannot.have primary 
·stress. (e) a dislocated pronoun .is necessarily an objective :form, 
and (f) the pronoun it can not be left dislocated--follow naturally 
from 	my theory, while they would require separa-~e ad hoc restrictions 
on left dislocation in an extrac~ion analysis. . . 
. Lakoff ( ) has proposed that the underlying (semantic} repre-
sentation of every sentence contains an element Topic (T) which is 
st,ructurally independent of P1 ~ ~he structure to which transformations 
apply. Moreover, various transformations may be made contingent on the 
information in T by means of global derivational co:p,straints.: In such 
a theory the properties of left dislocated noun phrases noted above 
(or at least some of these properties) _would not require separate 
conditions on the left dislocation rule. They couJ,.d all be acco'l,lllted 
for by one derivational constraint which states that the noun phrase 
moved by this rule must be· identical to T. I believe, however, that 
the analysis that I have proposed is preferable to such a solution for 
· the following reasons . 
1. 	 Since T is stru.cturally: independent of P1 , it is not obvious 
that·separate conditions would not have to be stated to 
·account fo.r the fact t};iat T cannot be an indefinite pronoun, 
a specific indefinite,:a noun phrase containing a quantifier, 
i.e., precisely those conditionp that would otherwise have 
to be stated on left dislocation. In my theory, on the 
other hand, these facts .follow from the structural position 
of NP1 with respect to S' (see· above), i.e., the fact _that 
NP1 is generated outside the scope of any quantifier. 2. 	 Such a proposal avoids the empirical question of whether the 
optimal analysis of th~- facts in question is one which 
complicates the base or one which complicates the trans-
formational component •. It complicates both. 
3. 	 The tremendous power of,derivational constraints makes it 
possible to account for i:i,lmost any phenomenon, thus making 
the task <::>f.,choosing the· correct grammar all_ that ·much 
more difficult. For this reason, it seems to me that a 
· theory whic_h is able to account for a given set of facts 
without appeal ~o such: constraints, provided no other 
sacl;'ifices such as· loss of generalization need to be made, 
is to be :preferred over a theory which accounts for the 
same set of facts with such constraints. 
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8. Left 	Dislocation in.Subordinate Clauses 
·so far we have been considering.only examples of left dislocation 
in t.he highest clause. ·· Though left d:faiocation is possible in some 
subordinate clauses as weil,. the:i situation is .not at all clear cut. 
That a general condition agairist left dislocation in subordinate clauses 
would be too strong is witnessed by (i35)-(l39), which appear to be 
acceptable to most.speakers. 
(135) Mary said tha:.t her grades, they weren't too good. 
(136) 	 I finally realized that t_hose slacks you gave me 
for my birthday, I won't be able to fit into 
them unless I lose f'.ive pounds. 
(137) 	 I know that those slacks, they're too tight for 
me now. 
(138) 	 She dreamt that her brother, he had been in an 
automobile accident. 
(139) 	 ?The professor admitted that his book, it w~sn't 
worth buying. 
Compare, however, (140)-(153), which r~ge from only marginally 
accepta"\)le to completely unacceptable. 
(140) 	 ?The professor refused to admit that his book, it 
wasn't worth buying. 
tl41) 	?Mary said that her grades, she wasn't too proud 
of them. 
(142) ?Jim claims that beans, he doesn't like them. 
(i4j)??Jim claims that be~ns, Mary doesn't like them: 
(i44)??If .my father, he comes home late, my mother won't 
talk tµ him for the rest of the evening. 
(145)??It started to rain after Jack and his friend, they 
had finally made it up the hill. 
(146) 	*It started to rain after Jack and his friend, we 
had finally managed to reach them. 
(147} 1•If my father, he -comes home late, we get to stay 
up an extra hour. 
(148) ,;While your paper I was res.ding it, I fell aslE?-P. 
(149) *That my brother, you don't like him is clear. 
(150) 	*Because those slacks, they don't fit me, I'll 
have to wear my new dress .. 
(151) 	 ;:'That those s·lacks you gave me for my birthday, 
I won't be able to fit into them unles·s I 
lose five pounds, is _obvious to me now. 
(152) 	¼:·After that report, Mary talked to the man who 
had written it, she swore she would.never eat 
p·eanut butter again. 
(153) *John entered the room after Bill he did. 
The contrast between (146)-(153); on the one hand, and (135)-(139) 
or even (146)~(145), on ihe other, is striking. Still another c6nstrast 
exists_ between all of' these sentences and examples of" l:ef't dislocation 
in a relative clause. The latter are not even intelligible, as 
illustrated by (1511)-(156). 
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' (1:54) 	 a. The man who -wrote that book is a ~ell known 
:J.in~ist .· 
b. 	*The man th~t boo~, ,rho wrote ~ t is a well-
known liqguist. 
b'. 	'~The man '\'fhq .that book, wrote it is a wE\11-
knowri linguist. 
(155) a. That dog who. bit your friend has rabies. 
b. '~hat dog your friend, who bit him has ;abies. 
b'. *That dog who your friend bit him has r~bies, 24 
(156) 	 a. The beans ~hich your brother ate made him sick. 
b. 	*The beans ~hich yo~ brothe;,·he ate made him 
sick. 
b'. 	*The beans your broth.er, ,which he ate m~de him 
sick. 
The following conclusions may be drawn from these facts. 
1. 	 Left dislocation in an object clause which does not have 
a lexical head noun, i.e., precisely those subordinate 
clauses that are not subject to Ross constraints, .is 
generally acceptable .. Though it is less acceptable .if 
the dislocated noun phrase is· not the subject of the 
clause (compare ho.wever (136)) or if th·.: verb is negated. 
2. 	 Left dislocation in co~plex noun phrases (including 
adYerbial and conditional clauses) and sentential : 
subjects is generally.not acceptable, though accepta-
bility of left dislocation in these clauses is increased 
somewhat if (a) the subordinate clause follows the main 
clause and the dislocated noun phrase is the subject,· 
or (b) there is a noup phrase in the main clause which 
is coreferential with tpe dislocated noun phrase. 
3. 	 Left dislocation.in a relative clause results in a  
completely unintelligible construction.  
Though a good deal more research on left dislocation and on topic-
comment structure in general is necessary before a satisfact~ory 
explanation of these- facts can even be attempted, there is s_ome 
evidence, I believe, that whether or not a noun phrase .can be 
dislocated inside a subordinate' clause depends on whether or not 
the whole sentence may be interpreted as a statement (question, etc.) 
about that noun phrase. If we claim that a dislocated noun phrase 
inside a subordinate clause actually originates outside the clause 
as an adjunct to the highest sentence, it will be necessary to 
incorporate into the grammar a :rule which can move the topic noun phrase 
into an embedded sentence .. In Gundel (1974) I argue on independent 
grounds in .favor of such a rul~. . 
Notice, for example, that ,a sentence with an adverbial.clause is 
generally not I about I a noun phrase in.side that clause. Thus, it 
seems to me .that sentences ( (160 )-(162) ar·e not natural responses 
to the questions in (157)-(159).25 
' (157) 	 What about the letter?· 
(158) 	 What about those slack3? 
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(159) · What about Bill? ·  
.(160).??After Mary wrote the letter she want tci bed.  
(161)??Because· those slacks don't .fi.t me, I'll .ha.ve .to.  
wear my new dress~ 
(162 )??John entered the· room after Bill did.· . 
~imilarly with sentential :subjebt clauses, thus, compare 
(163) 	 vfuat about your brother? ?,?That Mary doesn't 
like niy brother is clear. 
(164) 	 What about those slacks? ??That I don't be 
able to fit into those slacks unless I lose 
five pounds is obvious. 
On the other hand~ noun phrases inside sentential compiements of verbs 
like~' claim, believe, etc., are commonly what the sentence is 
·ab9ut, For example, 
(165) 	 What.about those slacks? I know that.those slacks 
are too tight for me now. 
(166) 	 What about your aunt? I think that my aunt is 
coming. 
(167) 	 What about his grades? Bill said that his grades 
weren't too good. 
Notice also that if the assumption about the topic-comment structure 
of relative clauses which was made in section 6.4 turns out to be· 
correct, this would explain why dislocation is impossible inside a 
realtive clause. T~e reason is that the topic of the sentence embedded 
insid.e the clause is always that noun phrase which is identical to the 
head noun, i.e., the relative pronoun ftself. 
8. l. In section 1.1 it was noted that a left dislocated noun phrase  
may be a pronoun. Moreover, if it is a first person pronoun, it may  
be reflexive, for example,  
(.168) Myself, I would have done it differently; 
Consider 	now the following sentences. 
(169) 	 As for myself, I never would have said that to 
Bill. 
(170) 	 Harry told Glinda that as for himself, he didn.' t 
like bagels. 
(171) Mary believes that as for hersel·f, she won't be 
_invited to the party. 
(172) ,:,As for himself, he doesn't like bagels. 
(173) l,As for herself, she won't be invited. 
. . . 
Ross '(1970) proposes that sentences like (169)-(171) are J)roduced by 
a rule that optionally converts to a re,;flexive any pr9noun appearing 
161· 
ip as for phrase -Which is prefixed· to an embedded clause, just in· 
case '!;his p:r:cinoun refers bac,k t"o the subject of the· next high~st 
sentence.' This solution' ; if correct; proiides evidence for the 
performativ~ a,nalysis·which Ross propose~'.:tn this paper. If there 
is a higher cJ:aus'7 .in logical struct.ure which conti3,ins a first person 
subject, this· would. explain why (169) unlike (172) and (173) ,'.\is 
grammatical even though it does not refer back to the subject. of a 
higher clause in the surface structure. 
There are a numb.er of cas,es where a reflexive in an as for 
phrase is not acceptable even ·though it is coreferential with: a noun 
phrase in a higher clause. For example: 
(174) .*That as for hers~lf she vouldn 1t be invited ~nraged 
Glinda. 
(175) 	"John rejected the claim that as for himself he 
didn't like bagels. 
(176) ,;The
I 
girl as 
-1 · . . · 
asfor herself who wasn't invited/who 
· for herself wasn't invited said that she would. 
never speak to'Glind/3, again. 
(177) 	 ¾:John told the girl who as for himself he didn't 
like/as for himself who he didn't like that she 
should never call him again. 
Ross' condition that the reflexive must refer.to the subject of the 
next highest clause will block (174); but it is not strong enqugh to 
exclude (175 )-(177) as well. , , ; 
If, as I suggested earlier, the NP in an as for phrase is in fact 
a left dislocated NP, this would automatically account for the 
unacceptability of (174)-(177), The derivations of these sentences 
would be excluded by the same prihciple(s) (whatever these may turn 
out to be) which block left dislocation in subordinate clauses. The 
fact that most speakers·accept sentences iike (170) and (171) does 
not constitute a counterexample to this hypothesis since, as was 
already pointed out, left dislocation is generally acceptable .inside 
an object clause which is not a c,omplex noun phrase. Moreover, if I 
am correct in.the .observation that left dislocation inside such 
clauses is less acceptable when t.he pronominal remnant of the dislocated 
noun phrase is not the subject of the clause, we would predict that 
reflexives in as for phrases are ialso less acceptable under those 
conditions. This is in fact the case, as the following examples 
illustrate. 
(178) 	 *John told Glind~ that as for himself, we wouldn't 
invite him. 
(179) 	 *Harry think9 that as for himself, I didn't see 
him. · 
(180) lt?Glinda sai.d that as for herself, bagels make , 
her vomit. 
Ross' analysis would not exclude any of these sentences,, 
Ross cited one other example, however, which would appear to 
indicate that the higher subj~ct' condition must be maintained. For 
' 
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him, and for mahy other.speakers~ (181) is less acceptable than 
(i82J. 
(18l)??Harry toid Glinda that as for herself, she 
wouldn't be "invited. 
(182) 	· Harry told-Glinda that as for himself, he 
wouldn't be invited. 
; 
I myself find only little appreciable difference between the two. 
Moreover, I have found that even tho~e speak~rs who reject (181) will 
accept it within an appropriate context, for example the following: 
(183) 	 Harry told Glinda that her children could come, 
but that as for herself, she wouldn't be invited. 
This of course still does not explain why (181) is found to be less 
acceptable than (182). It seems possible, however, that this fact is 
not speci:fically related to as for reflexivization in a subordinate 
clause but rather to left dislocation subordinate clauses in general. 
It was already seen that there a~e various (as yet unexplained) 
conditions that affect the grammaticality of left dislocation in 
subordinate clauses. Just as dislocation in a subordinate clause\is 
generally less acceptable if the dislocated NP is not the subject of 
the clause, it may also be less acceptable if it is coreferential w_ith 
a non-subject noun phrase in a higher ·clause (possibly for tpe same 
reason). On the other hand, various conditions, -such as the fact that 
the noun phrase in question contrasts with another noun phrase in a 
subordinate clause, as in (183) may be stronger than the subject 
condition. These assumptions are difficult to test since the dislocated 
noun phrase_wili necessarily be a pronoun ifr ;i.t is coreferential with 
a noun phrase in a higher ciause and dislocated pronouns in isubordinate 
clauses are in general not very acceptable, It seems to me, however, 
that there is a slight distinction in acceptability between '(184) and 
(185), which parallels that between (181) and (182)., i.e., (185) seems 
to me better than (184). · · 
(18~)??Harry told Glinda that 
be invited. 
(185) ?Harry told Glinda that 
be invited. 
(as for) her, 
(as for) him, 
she wouldn't 
he wouldn't 
I conclude therefore that the condition that reflesives in as 
for phrasE?_s must refer to a high_er subject must be rejected for the 
following reasons. 
1. 	 The condition is too weak if as for phrases are not 
assumed to be the same as dislocated phrases because 
it does not block (175)-(180) and it is unnecessary 
if as for pprases are the same·as dislocated noun 
phrases because the ungrammaticality of (174)-(180) 
would then follow from more ge~eral conditions on 
left dislocation in subordinate clauses. 
2. 	 The condition is too strong because it would block 
sentences like (183), 
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.If the reflexive in an as for.phrase does.not have to refer to· 
the subject of a .higher clause; (a) does it have t6 refer to a 
noun phrase in a higher clause atiall?, and (b) what e~actly is 
the source·of the as for reflexive. 
Concerping the first questioh. the unaccepta.bility of ( 172} 
and (173) demonstrates that in oraerfor an NP in an as for phrase 
or any dislocated NP for that matter) to be reflexive there must be 
a coreferential noun ph~ase somewhere else in the sentence.· Moreover, 
it appears that the noun phrase tb which the reflexive refers· must be 
· 'to the left I of the as for phrase. Thus, (186) with the. dislocated 
noun pqrase adjoined to the· highest sentence is unacceptable• · 
regardless of whethe·r the reflexive is to be interpreted as core-
ferent ial with Bill or with John. 
(186) 	*As for himself, Bill told John that he 
wouldn't be. invited. 
In this sense, the facts concerning reflexives in as for phrases still 
provide some support for the abstract-performative hypothesis, since 
this hypothesis makes it possible to explain the grammaticality of 
(i69). It is not clear, however,: that the noun phrase 1on the left' 
to whic;h the reflexive refers must Qecessarily be in a higher clause.• 
Thus, it seems to me that the following examples are both acceptable. 
(187) 	 Bill doesn't mind if his guests smoke pot but 
as for himself, he never touches the stuff. 
(188) 	 All of Harriet 1s frienq.s are coming to the .party, 
but as for herself, she wasn't in.vited. 
In {187) and (188) there is a core·ferential noun phrase to the left 
of the as for reflexive, but this noun phrase is not in a higher clause. 
There are other properties of reflexives in subordinate as for 
phrases which I am unable to pro~ide any expla~atiop for at present. 
Thus, while I believe that the noun phrase to which the reflexive 
refers is not necessarily the subject of a higher clause, sentences 
in which this is the ~ase and where, moreover, the main verb expresses 
some positive and voiuntary mental or verbal activity ·on the part of 
the subject are in fact the most:common and most acceptable. Thus, 
for example, (189), where the verb is negative and (190) where it is 
not a voluntary verbal or mental'activity reported by the speaker, are 
extremely awkward at best even though they meet the strongest 
conditions imposed OQ as for reflexives by Ross. -
(189)??John doubts that as for himself, he will.be 
invited. 
(l90)??Mary dreamt that as for herself, she wasn't 
invited. 
Cf. also 
(191) John thinks that as for himself, he won't be 
invited. 
but 
(192)?,iJolu,1 doesn't think that as for himself, he will 
be invited. 
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. 8 ~ 2. The Sour·ce of the as for Reflexive. There are at least two · 
d,i fferent reflexivizat ion processes: :i.p: ~nglish. Tl1e f:tfst, 
illustrated by (193) and .(194) reflexiv:i.zes the second of two 
coreferential ·.noun phrases if and only if ~hese are in the same 
clause. Reflexives derived in this manner are generally llllStressed. 
The second type, illustrated by (195) and (196), does not have to be 
in the same clause with its coreferent and most likely has as its 
source the so.:..called emphatic reflexive of sentences like (197) and · 
(198). This type is never unstressed. 
(193) Mary forgot to wash herself this morning. 
(194) 	 That John has a very high opinion of himself 
is obvious. 
(195) 	 The only linguist who John thinks Mary can 
trust is himself. 
(196) 	 John said that the letter had been written by 
Mary and himself. 
(197) 	 The only linguist who John thinks Mary can 
trust is him/John himself. 
(198) 	 John said that the letter had been written by 
Mary and him/John himself.\ . 
There is no reason to believe that the reflexive in as ·for phrases, 
i.e., the dislocated reflexive, is derived by a different rule than 
the one which optionally deletes the noun phrase immediately preceding 
an emphatic reflexive to produce sentences like (195) and (196), i.e. 
that the source for the as for reflexive is an emphatic reflexive. On 
the contrary, there is a good deal of evidence which suggests that it 
is so derived. 
1. The emphatic reflexive, although it must be stressed, does not 
necessarily have to have primary stress; it may have secondary stress, 
as in the following sentences: 
(199) I 	myself never would have said that. 
(200) I 	 thought that Jim himself didn't like b~gels. 
(201) As for Jim himself, he never drinks tea. 
(202) I~ 	Jim's wife, but Jim himself I didn't see. 
The reflexives in as for phrases always have secondary stress. While  
they, like dislocated noun phrases in general may never have primary  
stress (see above), they are never completely.unstressed either,26  
as may be the case with pronouns as.well as ordinary reflexives.  
2. Reflexives in as for· phrases have paraphrases with emphatic 
reflexives .in non-dislocated sentences and with emphatic reflexives 
in as for phrases, though the latter are extremely awkward if the noun 
phrase preceding the reflexive is a pronoun (probably because of the 
repetition of identical forms--see above). · 
(203) 	 a. John told Glinda that he himself didn't like 
bage'.l.s. 
b. 	?John told Glinda that as for himself, he 
didn't like bagels. 
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(20!1) a. I think that :you 'yourself probably have 
nothing to worry about: .. 
b. I t_hink that /:1,S for you yourself ;27 you 
probably ha've nothing to wo-r;ry about. 
c. I think th?,t as for yourself, you have nothing 
to worry ab,out . • 
(205) a. Bill's wi f'e often smokes pot, but Bill/he I 
himself never touches the stuff. · 
b. Bill's wife often smokes pot, but as for Bill/ 
.?him himself, he never touches the stuff. 
c. Bill's wife often smokes pot, but.as for him-
self, he ne'ver touches the stuff. 
3. A sentence may contain two reflexives if one of these is an 
ordinary reflexive and the other an emphatic reflexive, but not if both 
are emphatic reflesives. Thus, while (206) and (207) are acceptable, 
(208) 	and (209) are not. · 
(206) Jim himself forgot to wash himself this morning.
(207) 	 I myself have more confidence in myself than I 
used to. 
(208) 	 *Jim himself can't stand Mary herself. 
(209) 	*As for jim himseif, he ·didn't tel1 Mary herself 
that he was coming. 
If reflexives in as for phrases are emphatic reflexives, we woµld predict 
that they could not be followed by a sentence which already contains 
an emphatic refiexive. The following examples illustrate that this 
is the case. 
(210) a. I 	 don't like,Jim himself. 
b. As for myself, I don't like Jim. 
c. ,;As for myself, I don't like Jim himself. 
(211) 	 a. Jim claims that he didn't even'tell Mary 
herself that he was coming. 
b. 	 Jim claims that as for himself, he didn't' 
even tell Mary that he was coming. 
c. 	*Jim claims that as for himself, he didn't 
even tell Mary herself that he was coming.
i 	 . 
Thus, the hypothesis that reflexives in as for phrases are emphatic 
reflexives is not only consistent·witb the facts but receives support
. / . 
from them. 
The conditions under which a: noun phrase preceding an emphatic 
reflexive may be deleted are extr:emely complicated and, at present, 
unclear. It should be pointed o~t, however, that if a sentence like. 
(212) is acceptable, which I thin,k it may be, then the rule which 
d~letes noun prhases preceding emphatic reflexives must be allowed to 
delete full nouns as well as pronouns. ' 
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>(212) ?All of Harrief!s .friends a:re · coming to the party, 
but.· as for herself~ Harriet won't. be invited. 
Thist is so because there :is -no sottrce, either. in the extract ion . 
~al~sis or in .the theory wh.ich · I have proposed, for deriving 
sent~nces- wh~re the dislocated noun.phrase is a pronoun and the 
corr;es:ponding noun phrase in the matrix sentence a full noun. qucp 
exani,Ples are in face never acceptable. 
I .(213} *As for her, Harriet won't be invited. 
I' ha!ve suggested, however (and wil:}. argue further in P_art II) , that the 
gra:mµtar be allowed to generate sentences in which both the dislocated 
noun!. phrase and the corresponding noun phrase in the matrix sentence 
are ifull nouns',
' 
PAET, II 
9, Topic and Comment in other Sentences. On Deriving All Sentences 
From Underlying Left Dislocated Structures. 
i In.Part I, I argued ·in favor of a theory which would derive the 
leftl dislocated sentences' in (214) arid (215) from the logical ·structures 
in (i216) and (217) respectively.
) . 
. (214) (As for} topic comment structure, I" don't understand 
it. 
(215)- (As for) that book I borrowed from you last week, 
I'll return it tomorrow. 
) 
(216) 
____-9------
NP . . S' 
I 1 . ~ 
x1: t-c structure I don't understand x 
(217) s 
S' 
I ~ 
x1 : that book I :r will return x tomorrow 
borrowed· from 
•.•.• week 
It was shown, moreover, that the function of the dislocated noun 
phrise,. i.e., the function of NP1, is to name what the following 
.predicative sentence (S') is about. While 9' represents vhat is 
acttj.ally predicated about NP1, its illocution!3,ry force (whether it 
assJrts, questions, promises, etc. ) depending on the particular ,speech 
actjthat the sentence is used to per~orm. We designated the former 
function as that of topic. and the latter function as that of comment. 
A l~ft dislocated sentence thus always answer~ some implicit or 
exp1icit questi_on--what about x, where x is the dislocated noun phrase ,28 
NP 
'•'"' 
' 
I 
-~---~--·."··~·· --.---~--·-~"'*-·· . -· ------------·-----,-... , -
i 
... / .. 
:{. 
put is not responsive to such a qu:estion where x is ·some elemeirE other 
than the. dislocated' rioun phrase. . . 
The distinction between .tqe element.which names what the sentence' 
(mor_e e:xactly the speech act) is about arHi> t·he actual predication niade · 
~bout that thing is,· as I will arg~e below, not Just a property of · 
left dislocated structures,· but isl·characteristic of all sent~nces. 
What distinguishes the left disloca:ted constructions is that in. these 
the distinction is structurally.explicit and unambiguous in the surface 
;form qf the sentence, Thus, for example, it is necessary to account 
for the fact t.hat (218), Hke (214;) is responsive to the question in 
(219), ! . ' 
· (218) I don't understan'd topic-comment structure. 
[An underlined word indicates position of primary stress.] 
(219) What about topic~corrunent structure? 
Sentence (220), on the other hand, is not responsive to (219); it 
may, however, answer any of the questions ·in (221). 
, 
(220) I 	 don't understand topic-comment structure. 
(221) a. What about you? 
b. 	 What about what you qon 't understand? What 
is the thing that you don't understand? 
c, 	 What I s new? ,What I s wrong? What 's happening? 
etc, ·(Tell me something about the situ~tion 
you find yourself in at present;) 
i 
( 218) is responsive to (221a) as well; 29 but it cannot answer ( 221b) 
or (221c). Similarly, (222) is responsive to (223) but not to: (219) 
or any of the questions in (221). 
(222) I 	 don't understand topic-comment structure. 
(223) 	 What about the person who d6esn 't understand f,opic-
coJl!Ilient structure? 
Who 	 is the person who doesn't understand topic-
comment structure. 
(222), moreover, is synonymous with (224), which is also responsive 
to (223). 
(224) 	 The one who does~'t understand topic-comment 
structure is me. 
Compare also the following senten~es. 
(225) 	 As for topic-comment structure, I don't under~ 
stand it. 
· (226) As for what I wo~ 't understand, .r don't under\-
stand topic-coniment structure. 
., 
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i(227j *As for the person·who doesn't understand topic~ 
comment structure~ I don't understand it. 
(228) 	 · As for what I don't understand, I don.'t ·under-
stand topic-comment structui'e. 
(229f As for what I don't understand, it is.topic-
comrilent structure • 
.(230 ). *As for topic-comment structure, I don't under-
stand topic..:.comment structur.e . 
. (231) ;~As for tqpic-comment ·structure; what I don't ,· 
understand is it. 
(232} 	*As for (the preson) who doesn't understand topic-
comment structure, I don't understand topic-
conunent structure. 
(233) 	 As for (the person) who doesn't understand topic-
. comment' structure' I don It understand it. 
(234) ?*As for topic-conunent s"truct1:1,re, I don't under-
stand it •. 
(235} 	;,As for what I don't understand,. I don 1t understand 
topic-comment structure. 
(236) *As for m'e, f·don 1t understand topic-corrunent 
struct.ure. 
(237) 	 As for (the one) who doesn't understand topic-
commerit. structure, it is rile. 
(238) 	*As for what I don't understand, the one who 
doesn't understand topic-comment structure is me. 
These' examples show that a particular. noun phrase,. x, may appear in 
an about phrase preceding a given sentence jµst in case that sentence 
is an appropriate· response to the implicit o~ e~plicit question--what 
about x, but not otherwise. 
~le can account for the above facts in a natural way if we derive 
all sentences from structures like (216), where NP1 will be identical 
for two given sentences, just in case they are both responsive to the 
same question--wh~t about x?. Topic ma,y thus.be formally defined as 
the r~lation NP1: S and comment as t.he relation S': S, where topic 
and c~mment are assigned semantic values roughly as follows: 
(239) 	 Definition. If Tis the topic· of S, then S 
asserts, asks, pr.omises, etc., something about 
T, depending on the type of speech act that S 
is used to perform. 
(240) 	 Definition. .If C i~ the comment of S, then C 
is what S asserts, asks, promises, etc., about 
the topic of S, depending on the type of 
speech act that.sis used to perform. 
Sentence (218)., like (214) is derived from (216). But for (220) and 
(222), NP1 and S' in logical structure are different. Sentences (218) 
. . · .. · ·----:· ~~-.-····-· ---....·----~-----,-- ·----·.. ----- .. 
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and (214), but not·(220) and (222); are then interpreted as in (216i) 
;(216') I dCJn,-'t under,sta~d x i~s asserted to 'be true 
about x1, where_ x1 is fopic-comment structure. 
In order to der"ive (218) from (216) it is necessary to incorporate 
into the grammar two rules, in addition to the ones we have already 
discussed in previoµs .s·ec::"tions. 
(241) Topic copying--copy NP1 into the corresponding 
variable in S 1 •  
· (2!12) 'I'opic deletion--d~lete :NP1.  
(241) and (242) could be two aspects of the same rule, i.e., we mjght 
propose a rule that copies NP1 into the corresponding variable in S' 
and the same time deletes the original occurrence of NP1 (in a sense 
the reverse of left dislocation), ·but then, unless the second part of 
·t·he rule is somehow m,ade optional,, there would be no way of deriving 
sentences like ( 243) an,d ( 244); 
(243) 	 (As fo~) topic-comment structure, I don't under-
stand topic-conunent structure at all. 
(244) 	 (Concerning) that:book, I promise to return that 
book to you next week. 
I
These sentences seem to me at least marginally acceptable and 
certainly acceptable with the preceding about phrase. Notice that 
when there is a greater amount of l)'laterial. separating the two identical 
noun phrases (see also rrry note in Part I) such constructions become 
more acceptable even without the about nhrase. 
(245) 	 (As _for) topic-comment structure, Bill told Mary 
his professor claimed he was·working on an 
analysis of topic-comment structure that would 
revolutionize linguistic theory. 
(246) (As ·for) that book, I promised Bill that I would 
ask Harriet to return that book the next time 
she went to the library.· 
Another possib1lity is that topic-copying is just a special case 
·or feature copying, the rule that copies the features of a noun phrase 
onto a corresponding variable that· is l_ater replaced by a pronominal 
form. That is, there may be·a rul~ which applies 'in degrees' copying 
various aspects of a ·noun phrase--specific features, the whole noun 
phrase or possibily· just the head 9f a complex noun phrase, as in (247). 
(247) 	 That book I borrowed from you last week, I'll 
.return.the book to you tomorrow. 
I will assume for the present, however, that the rules involved in  
deriving (218) from (.216) are (241) and (242). The derivation of  
(218) from (216) is thus roughly as follows. 
. . ·-'------- . '----~ ·----·----------w ··-·-----· ---·-~ . _ _____._____ -~·... --·~-- ~. 
···i . 
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.1. (2i6) 
~tress placement ( see section 3 .:3) 
2. 8 
· NP1
I 
x1 : . t-c structure I 
S' 
I 
don't un,derstand X 
+ stress 
topic copying 
3. .8 
S'NP1 
I 	 I· 
t-,c structure 	 I don't understand t-c structure 
+ stress 
Topic deletion  
Tree Pruning30  
8 14.  
I -========  don't understand·topic.:.comment structure 
Sentence (220) will be derived from any of the structures (248)-(250). 
(248) 	 s 
NP1 ----~S' 
·1 	  
x1: time t I don't understand topic-
place, p comment structure (?.at 
(249) 	 s------~S'NP1 
I  
xi: 	I X doesn't understand topic~ 
comment structure 
S'NP1 	 . 
I 
x1: I don't under- x be (identified a~) t6pic-= stand 	 comment structurex1 
These structures are interpreted respectively as follows:· 
(250) 
.. ---·-- .--~-----. .---· _., ...~--~~---- --- ,•- -- - ---~ 
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·(248 1 ) I don't understand topic-comment structure 
. is asserted t'o ·be true about a particular . 
s~tu:ati_on (ti:"Je and place),, x
1
. · · · 
(249') x doesn't understand topic-:-comment·strlicture 
·is as sert.ed to be true about .xi, wriere x1
is the speaker.
(250 I) x 	 1.s tdentified, as topic-conunent structure is 
asserted to b~ true about x1, ,where xl is 
what the speak,er does not understand. 
The derivation of (220) from (248) involves stress placement, 
which will assign primary stress to :the noun phrase topic-comment 
structure, and topic-deletion, wh:ich deletes NP1, In deriving (249) 
from (220), (a) stress placement assigns primary stress to the noun 
phrase, (b) t-c structure, topic-copying copies NP1, l, onto x and· 
(c) topic 	deletion deletes the or-iginal NP1. 
9.1. In order to derive (220) fr9m (250) it is necessary to incor-
porate into the grammar a rule of'..predicate nominal incorporation; 
which may be stated informally as' follows: 
(251) predicate nominal incorporation 
(1) 	copy a predicate nominal onto a variable in 
the sentence embedded in the noun phrase to 
the left of be, (i.e. , the subject· noun phrase 
with which the predicate nominal is asserted 
to be coreferential), where that variable is 
coreferential with the head noun. 
(2) Delete be, the predicate nominal, and the 
variable which:is the head noun .. 
This rule, which must apply after topic copying, will move the noun 
phrase topic-conunent .structure into the position of the second 
occurrence of the variable in t~e subject noun phrase in (3) below 
and then delete· be, ·the predicate .nominal and the first occurrence 
of the variable.- · · 
The derivation of (220) from (250) is thus as follows. 
1. (250) 
stress placement 
2. 	 :s 
NP1·. 
~ ----	 ~  NP S x be (identified as)I I ·r 	don't underst~nd x1 topic-conunent structure.x1 + 	stress 
-----------
-----
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topic copying 
topic deletion 
tree pruning 
3. 
~ 
s
--------'-...,..___ 
NP be ~ 
~ 1. 
NP S topic-comment structure 
I~ 
x1 I don't understand 
x1 
predicate nominal incorporation 
4:. s 
NP VP 
I ~-
r don't understand topic-comment 
structure. 
If topic de:tetion had not ?,pplied, the result·would be, after 
-relativizat1on, 
I 
(?5:?.} As for what I don't understand, I don't 
understand topic-comment structure. 
Sentence (222) which is only responsive to a question--what 
about x?, where xis (the one) who doesn't understand t-c structure 
is, like (224) derived from. the structure in (224 1 ), as follows. 
(224' ) s__.;------------
NP - S' 
~-~- . 
l'. ·r-==-===----===- ·~ 
x1 x1 doesn't understand x be I 
t-c structure 
stress placement 
topic copying 
topic deletion 
2~ s 
NP be NP/. 
..NP . S I/me,~ I +stress 
x1 x doesn't understand 
t-c structure 
······-''-""'"·-·~·..,_ ~. -.- .~--... -~ '',. . 	 ·., 
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(224) if predicate nominal incorporation· ¢1.o'esn 't app.l.y: 
uredicate nominal iricorporat:ion 
3. 	 s 
NP VP 
I ~ 
I don't un4erstand t-c 
+stress structure 
Although the derivation of (222) from (224') and of one reading 
of (220) from (250) involves a complication in the grammal'. for which 
there. does not appear to be any i,ndependent syntactic evidence, 
namely the rule of predicate nominal inc.orporation, this complication 
is not just a consequence of the :analysis .of topic:..comment structure 
that I have proposed here, i.e., \he hypothesis that topic arid comment 
I 	 . 
are co-generated constituents NPJ and S 1 in logical structure. It has 
been argued, quite independently of such an analysis (cf. for.example 
.Postal (1971)) that sentences with so-called 'emphatic stress', that 
is, sentences which have readings that may be paraphrased by equative 
sentences like (224), should have the same underlying source as the 
·1atter. In addition to the paraphrase relationship between sentences 
with 'emphatic stress' .and equatfve sentences, the follqwing·arguments 
may be adduced in favor of an analysis which derives the two from the 
same und.erlying structure. 
1. Sentences with different stress patterns differ not only in 
'emphasis' but in cognitive content, i.e., in aspects of meaning 
relevant to determination of the truth value of statements. Compare, 
for example, the two sentences cited by Postal (1971). 
(253) 	 Only voiced consonants can occur in word final 
position. 
(254) 	 Only voiced consonants can occur in word final 
position. 
The first sentence is incompatible with the statement that either 
voiceless consonants or vowels can occur in word final position; the 
second one is not, s~nce it asserts only that the only voiced elements 
which can occur are voiced consonants. 
2. As I argue.in Gundel (1974), sentences with 'emphatic stress' 
share presuppositions (hence also facts concerning appropriateness of 
response to different questions) with corresponding equative. sentences. 
but differ in presuppositions from corresponding sentences which are 
structurally identical except that they have a different stress pattern. 
Deriving emphatically stressed sentences from the structures underlying 
corresponding equative sentences.makes it possible not 9nly to account 
for these facts in a natural way, but, if my analysis of topic-comment 
structure is accepted, to relate the presuppositions in question to 
existential presuppositions in·general. It will not be necessary to 
devise separate means of accounting for the presuppositions associated 
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with .sentences with different stress .patterns, equative sentences 
and definite referring expressions. Ra.th~r,: these will all be 
accounted for by the ·same general principles;, which may be stated. 
informally as follows: i· 
! 
(255) 	 If T is the Topic of S and ~ is the Comment 
of S, then Sis successfully used in pre-
dicating C of an object (9r set of objects) 
X if and only if T involves ·a successful 
. reference to X. · I 
(256) 	 An expression, R~ involves a successful reference 
if and only if there exists in some real or 
imaginary world an object· (or set of objects) 
X such that either R contains an identifying 
description of X, or the speaker is able to 
supplement R with an identifying description 
of X, ahd such that, in the utterance of R, 
the speaker intends to pick out or identify X 
to the hearer.31 
; 
i
If a sentence like ( 222) presupposes a successful reference. to some 
object--the .one who doesn't understand touic~comrnent structure then it 
of course follows that it also presupposes there is someone who 
doesn 1 t understand topic-comment structure. ! . 
3. If we derive a sentence like. (220) Cmore exactly one reading 
of this sentence )from the structure. which underlies the corresponding 
P.r1uative sentence, this explains the possibility of a sentence like 
(252). Otherwise, the dislocated noun phras~, which has no copy in 
the main sentence in surface structure, would have no source. 
·4. Along side question and answer pairs like 
(257) Was it Bill who hit Loretta:1 
(258) No, it was Harry. 1 i 
I 
(259) Was the one who hit Loret ta )Bill? 
(250) No, it was Harry. 
where (258) is a proper response to both (257:) ~nd (259), and it 
refers in both cases to the description the dne who hit Loretta32 
w_e have pairs like 
(260) Did Bill hit Loretta. 
(258) No, it was Harry. 
where it, again can refer only to· the one who. hit Loretta and the 
deletedclause. in (258), apparently who hit Loretta is not present in 
the surface structure of (260). (Normally in: question-answer pairs
I 
an el,ement may be deleted in the answer if i ti is a repetition of ai1 
element in the question, e.g., Are you going f,Iith Bill? No, (with 
Harry.) Deriving (260) from the same structulre that underlies (2,57) 
and (259) offers. a principled basis for explo\ning the fact that, (258) 
is a proper response to (260), and, in particular, for the sour•.'<= of 
( 	 . I 
it, which in this case cannot refer to any element in the surface 
structure of (258). 
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. 5. The syntactic behavior;· of certain emphatically i;;tressea 
elementi:.i·, for example r.eflexi ve13, is di;stinct from that• of the 
correspor1ding non-:-stressed eiements. · . Thus, as discussed in Postal 
· . (1971), a noun phrase may not 	.cioss over a coreferential noun phrase 
within the same clause. Such al restriction is necessarr in order 
to block derivation of (261a) and (26],b).. 
(261) a.~ ,fJohn is adµli;ed by himself.· 
b. John admires himself. 
Unless stressed reflexives have a derivation which is distinct from 
non-stressed reflexives, in patj:;icular one in which the reflesive 
and the noun phrase with which 	it is coreferential do not originate 
in the same clause, sentences like (261c) constitute an unexplained 
exception to the above generali~ation. 
(261) c. John is admired {only) by himself. 
If we derive sentences like (261c) from correspc:mding equative 
structures this exception will 	9e explained. 
It seems plausible that the source for the reflexive in sentences 
like (261c) is the emphatic reflexive discussed in section 
i.e., (261c) is derived from (261d), which in turn is derived from 
the structure llilderlying (26le): 
(261) d. John is admired only by John himself. 
e. The only o~e who John is admired by is 
Jol:1n himself . 
.9.2. We have been assuming so far that either feature copying or 
topic copying must apply to copy part (or all) of NP1 onto the 
corres:ponding variable in S 1 • But what if neither rule applies? 
Assuming that there is already a rule in the grammar which will delete 
any surface structure node that does not dominate any lexical material, 
t.he result for a structure like. (216), for example, would be (262'), 
the structure immediately underlying (262) (assuming that topic 
deletion can apply only if either topic or feature copying has applied 
as well). 
(262 1 ) 	 , S 
~~ 
S 1NP · 
I  
t-c structure I don't 	understand 
+stress 
(262) Topic-comment structure, I don't understand. 
In Gundel (1974) I argue that so-called topicalized sentences like 
(262) are in fact derived from corresponding left dislocated structures 
by a rule that deletes the variable in S 1 • If this deletion rule is 
a general rule deleting nodes which dominate no lexical material, 
then n.o special rule .is needed in order to derive topicalized sentences 
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like (262). Notice~ however:; ·that the result of ·such an analysis 
for a structure like (249) is not a topicalized sentence, but rather 
precisely thE;? same senten~e that would be derived if topic cop1ing ·· :and topic deletion had applied, Le., (220), This· means -t;hat _ 220), 
where the topic is the speaker, could actually haire two separate 
derived structures, represented in _(263) and (264-). - .. 
(263) .S 
NP S' 
I ~ 
I don't-understand topic~ 
comment structure 
.variable deletion 
(264) - (8)  
I  
S' 
NP . . VP 
I 	 . ~ 
I 	 don't under~tand topic-
comment structure 
topic copyirig 
topic deletion 
But this situation is not as bad as it may at first appear; in fact_, 
it may explain certain intonational properties-of I?, sentence like 
(220). Thus, for example; it has often been noted that a sentence 
like (265) (or (220)) may be uttered with or without -an intonational 
pause between the subject noun phrase and the rest of the sentence. 
The former option is particularly common if the subject is being 
explicitly contrasted or _compared with someone else in.the given 
context. 
(265) John has always been one of my be~t friends.· 
If there are two possible derivations for (265), where John, moreover, 
is topic in both, then this fact is explained. If the structure that 
immediately underlies (265) is one like (263) then there is a pause 
between John and the rest of the sentence; if it is a structure like 
(274) then there it no pause. · -	 · 
10. Some alternative solutions. 
In Gundel (1974) I argue that there is no semantic or syntactic 
motivation for distinguishing a notion 'topic' as first element or 
first noun phrase in surface structure, or in general for distinguishing 
a division of the sentence into topi~ 'what the sentence is about' and 
comment 'what is said about that thing' which is different from the 
.distinction 	between what is presupposed in the s_entence (sometimes 
referred to as given or known information) and what is actually predicated 
.. ' '~ .. ,- ·---· ,----·-----:-. . " . . . . . . . ' . . 
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(i.e., ·asserted, ques:tione_d, proinised, etc.). · I argue further that 
what is presupposed is.).n fact der~vable from the exist~ntial pre-
suppositicin :(tlle princ;i:p:+e of succ~ssful·r~f~rence) as.socfat~d with 
what the senten,ce is about. . . ' " ' 
It was shown further that if Xis the topic of a given sentence, 
what that sentenc;e is a predication about (in a sense which is 
consistent with the relationship between topic and presupposition noted 
above) it is possible for that sent'ence to answer an explicit or 
implicit question--what about x?; and to be preceded by an about phrase
containing x. · · ---
In Part I of this paper, I argued that sentences of the latter 
type, i.e., left dislocated sentences, are derived from lOgical 
structures in which a noun phrase, ·NP1, is cogenerated with a sentence 
S' , where NP1 is designated as the :topic, the noun phrase which· names · 
or id~ntifies what the sentence is about, and S 1 is designated as 
comment, the· actual predication tha_t is made about NP1 • In Part. II 
it was shown that such structures c,ould, without considerable unmotivated 
complications in the grammar, be generalized to ·all .sentences, Such an 
analysis would make it possible to account for the notion of what the 
sentence is about, whether or not it may answer a particular question--
what about x?, and at the same time:, given certain principles of 
referenc,e and predication, would explain the relationship between the 
topic-comment distinction and an ac_count of the presuppositional differences 
between sentences. 
It is generally recognized tha;t the concepts which I have 
attempted to account for in the theory presented above are crucia.J, in 
determining certain paraphrase relationsh:i.ps between sentences, whether 
or not a given sentence is responsive to a particular question and, 
in general, whether or not a sentence may be successfully uttered in 
a given context.. · These facts, moreover, intertwine with the application 
of such proposed transformations as pseudo-cleft formation, left 
dislocation, topicalization, emphatic stress placeme~t, etc. .I will 
now briefly examine some alternative proposals to account for these 
facts. I will first discuss the possibility of accounting for these 
facts by means of interpretation rules that operate on the surface 
stru~ture of sentences, and will then examine two specific proposals 
that have been put forward which would account for these phenomena at 
the level of logical (semantic) structure and which are, moreover, 
distinct from the proposal put for~ard here. 
10.1. An Interpretavist Solution. It might be suggested, following 
the nroposed analysis of focus and .presupposition s·uggested in Chomsky 
(1970) that the distinction between: what the sentence is (or may be) 
about and what is actually predicated about that thing may be 
interpreted from surface structure :roug}:J.ly as fo.llows: 
' (266) 	 Replace some constituent containing the 
intonation cent~r (primary stress) by a 
variable and replace yin the· formula in 
(267) by the resulting sentence. Place 
the constituent whi.ch was chosen to be 
replaced by a variable in the position of 
Z in (267). 
ll8 
. . . 
(267) 	 X is Z is :predic:ated (i.e., 8.SSEfrted, 
l questioned, etc~.) :Qf xi where x1-Is Y. · 
Y is what is 	presuppos~d and t~e topic of the se~tence is the obj~ct 
(concept, etc.) identified by th¢ property Y. This pri_nciple would 
predict that (268) has roughly the three·interpretations represented 
in (269) .33 
(268) 	 Henry signed the. treaty. 
(269) 	 a. xis [Henry sigried the treaty] is predicated 
of x1, wher~ x1 is [x (happened?)]. 
b. 	 xis [signed the treaty] is predicated of 
x1 , where is [Henry x (something?)].x1 
c. 	 xis [the treaty] is predicated of x1 • where 
xi is [Henry signed xJ. · 
Subject to certain refinements (such as what exactly does the x·in (2) 
and (b) stand for), (269a )-( 269~) are, in fact analogous to the inter-
pretations assigned by our theor;y- to sentence (220). - There are a 
number of reasons, however, why I believe the pr9posal outlined above 
is less adequate than the analysis that I have suggested. 
1. It can.not correctly predict what is .predicated as opposed 
to what is presupposed (what the sentence is aqout) in thqse cases 
where the element that ·represents new information is not a continuous 
constituent in surface structure. For example, a sentence like (270). 
(270) 	 John said that someone told Mary she couldn't 
attend the meeting tonight. 
(270) can certainly be interpreted as a statement about Mary. It 
can answer the question--What about Mary?, What happ_e:(led to Mary?, 
etc. , and it may be preceded by an about phrase containing Mary, i.e. , 
t 
(271) 	 (as ·ror) Mary, John said someone told her she 
couldn't come to the meeting tonight. 
In other 	words, (270) may be interpreted as follows: 
(272) 	 John said that ·someone told x that Y .couldn't 
attend the meeting tonight is predicated of 
x1, where x1 is Mary. 
Yet the Interpretavist position outlined above would predict that 
the only possible interpretations of (271) are: 
(273) 	 a. xis [she couldn't come to the meeting 
tonight] is predicated of Xl, where Xl 
is [someone told Mary xJ. . 
b. 	 xis [told Mary she couldn't come to the 
meeting tonight] is predicated of xi, 
where x1 is [John said someone.(did) xJ. 
J 
/ 
····---·~-..., -----··-~·-··-· .- - .--·---------- - ·----·--~---~---·-·. . . 
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(2J3) ·c.; X 	 is [someO:ne ·tol.d Mary .she C.tluldn 1t CQtne to 
the meeting tonight] is predicated of x1, 
;.:here *1 :is C'Jo\m s.·aid x]. 
d, x 	 is [said !someone told Mary••. J is preiiicated 
of xi, ·where is [Joh~ (did) xJ.x1 
e. 	 x. [John said someone told Ma,ry .•. J is 
predicated of x1 where is x Cso~ethingx1
happened?;?~ . 
Notice thl3.t (274), t_he question corresponding to. (272) inay appropriately 
be answered by any bf the statements in (275), indicating that what 
is requested in (274) is information about Mary. 
(27!.) Did John say that someone told Mary she couldn't 
come to the meeting tonight? 
(275) 	 No. Harry claims that Bill insisted she wouldn't 
be able to understand what was go-ing on. 
No. Bill asked her to go to.the movies. 
No. Mary never attends meetings. 
No. Mary_is crying because she thinks no one 
µnderstands what she's trying to say . 
. No. Bill ordered her to stay home. 
I know-nothing about what's going on with Mary. 
2. Unless an additional condition is placed on (266} (or any 
theory that ·attempts to interpret what is being predicated from surface 
structure) which states that the constituent including the primary 
stressed element, i~e., the constituent replaced by a variable. may 
not itself contain an explicit performative clause, the interpretive 
rules will incorrectly predict that.in (276) the-speaker is asserting_ 
that he is giving an order. 
(276) 	 I am hereby ordering all of you to turn your 
thermostats down to 68°. 
That (276) cannot. be an assertion about what the speaker is doing is 
witnessed by the fact that the expressions in (278) are possible 
responses to (277) ·, for example, but not to (276). 
(277) I 	am reading the book now. 
(278) 	 No you 're not. :  
That's a lie.  
Do you expect me to believe that?  
3. As I argued in Gundel (1974) the topic and hence the 
presupposed elements of sentences like· 
(279) 	 There will be a· tornado,  
It is windy.  
Someone just wa'lked in.  
There's nothing to do.  
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may not b_e a coristituent. in surface s:tructure:, or even any element 
that.:;may. be interpreted .from some const_itl).ent in surfa,ce s.tructure. 
4 ... Replacing a primary stressed co_nstituent. by a variable makes 
fals~ 'predict_ior,s, about the presuppositions o_f ~left ahd pseudo-:-cleft 
sentences_. · While the presuppositions of (280")-(282) are the same, 
this.principle would predict that they are different, worse yet it 
would predict that (281) and (282) presuppose a near.tautology. 
(280) , The television woke me up. 
prsp: something wok_e me up. 
(281) What woke me up was. the television. 
prsp: *What woke me up was something 
(282) It was the television that woke me up. 
prsp: *It was something that woke me up. 
Since the p~edicted presuppositions.for (281) and (282) themselves 
presuppose that something woke the speaker up they either fail to 
assert or ass~rt a truth (hence the un~cceptability of these sentences). 
5. Interpreting the presuppositions of a sentence like (280),. · 
for example, from surface structure, precludes any uniform and coherent 
tr.eatment of presuppositions sh1ce i:t does not relate the presupposition 
associated with (280) with that associated with the clause what woke 
me up in (281) or with the relative clause in (283). 
(283) What woke me up is difficult for me to talk about. 
A completely different means would therefore have to be invented to 
account for what appears to be essentially the same phenomenon. 34' 
10.2'. Muraki 's Theory. In his. dissertation Muraki (1910) proposes 
that the underlying (semantic) representations of sentences contain 
as their highest predicate the verb presuppose which relates two , 
sentences, 81 and 82, the first of these representing the presupposition 
and the second the assertion of the .given sentence. The rule of left 
dislocation is.made sensitive to.the material in_S1 , i.e., it is 
constrained to apply only to an element that 'represents the pre-
supposition'. The intonational pattern of se_ntences is detennined by 
a rule that operates on two structures s1 and 82 which are identical 
except for the fact that there is a dummy in s1 which corresponds to 
some element in 82 and assigns primary stress to this.element. 
Optional rules convert 81 into the relative clause of cleft and pseudo-
cleft sentences and a later rule deletes after al+ transformationss1 
which are sensitive to the information contained in it have applied. 
Thus, for example, (284)-(287) would all ·be derived from the structure 
in (288). 
(284) John at.e an ~-
(285) (As for) John, he ate an~-
(286) What John ate was an ~- , 
(287) It. was an apple that John ate: 
,_.._ '-'•---w-- ·-••• •-
• ' 
(28~) 
l·. I 
.S 
82 
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~ ~: 
John at,e Jolin ate an 
Dummy 1 · apple 
While (286) and (287) canhave ks their source only the structqre in 
(288), (284) and (285) can also be derived from any of the following. 
(289) 	 s 
prsp s1 S2 
~-~ 
John did S John at~ an 
' ~ 
John Dummy 
apple 
(290) 	 . S 
' ~~ ' 
prsp s1 ,: 	 82 · . ~ ~
John Dunimy John ate an apple 
A clear advantage of this theory is .that it offers a principled basis 
for explaining the relationship between pres~pposition and sentence 
intonation. It does so, moreover, wi½h a single rule of st~ess 
specification, thus eliminating ·the need for two s·eparate rules--
nuclear stress rule (for 'normal' stress) and emphatic stress rule 
(for 'emphatic' stress) which is' assumed in the stand~rd theory. 
However, I find a number oi serious objections to Muraki's 
proposal. First of all, there are in general, two reasonable alterna-
tives to account for presuppositions associated with a given sentence: 
(1) simply.list.the presuppositions of a sentence in its semantic 
representation and (2) invent a principle which would systematically 
.interpret 	the presuppositions o( a sentence from some level (or levels) 
in its derivation. I believe that the second alternative would clearly 
be preferable for reasons of simplicity and generality and .should 
therefore be fully explored before any version o·r the first alternative 
is accepted. Muraki's proposal not only makes it necessary to list 
presuppositions separately for each sentence, but it does so in a 
highly artificial manner. His theory makes the claim that the underlying 
(semantic) representation of a sentence is an assertion about what the 
sentence presupposes. Note, in particular, the problems that such a 
solution would pose for a performative analysis such as the one 
proposed in Ross (1970). Thus, we certainly would not want to claim 
that the semantic representation of (291) is (292). 
(291) Was it an apple that John ate? 
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. (292 r · 
v· NP NP 
I I 	 I 
ask . you s 
~ 
prsp s1 s2.-::::::::::::- ..-::::::::::-: 
John ~te John ate 
Dummy an apple 
(291) clearly does not request information about the presupposition 
of 82. As Muraki himself points out.~ a similar problem arises in 
connection with a sentence like (293). 
(293) 	 I:t was\Mary who said that what John was carrying 
· was a revolver. 
The P-marker which immediately precedes stress specification for (293) 
should be ( 294). 
(294) s 
s 
~ ~ 
Dum said S M said S 
~ ~ 
prsp S S prsp S S 
/">.~. L"-.6.. 
JC Dum' JC R JC Dum JCR 
But· (294) does not correctly represent the semantic structure of 
( 293). In particular the predicate ~ should not be within the 
sc;ope of the predicate said. In order to cope with this problem, it 
is necessary for Muraki to propose an additional rule of presupposition 
embedding which would operate on t.he presuppositions in (295), the 
correct semantic structure for (293), and embed it· into the constituent 
sentences, resulting in the structure in (294 )·. 
· prsp s 
(295) s 
prsp 
JC Dum • 
Dum said S M said S 
6 
JCR 
.6. 
JCR 
However, another problem arises with respect to a sentence like (293). 
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T'ne structure in (294) makes the claim that the speaker conunits .. : 
bimself to the presupposition that John was carryirig SO!'Ilething. But 
this is nqt necessarily the case~ Iri orde:t to account f9r tnis fact, 
it is ni;c~ssary for Murak{ to propose an alternative source for 
(293), namely the structure in (296). 
(296) 	 s 
Ipr:3.p 8, 
~· ~ 
prsp 8 Sprsp~: ~ 
L's, ~ 
JC Dum Dum said S JC Du.~ M said S 
D 	 6 
JCR JCR 
• 
Another objection to Muraki '.s proposal concerns his treatment of 
the notions topic and presuppositJon. 'Mu,raki refers to the noun 
phrase with the postposition ~ iµ a Japanese sentence like (297) 
as the theme. 	 i 
(297) John-wa Mary-a n~gutta 
John 	 Mary hit 
11As for John, ;he hit Mary11 
He.further suggests that the relationship between a theme x and the 
rest of the sentence ;[_ be read as follows: y i,s stated about x which 
is the theme of the present discourse. Thus, what Muraki calls theme 
corresponds essentially to what 1: have been calling topic. However:--
he also d~stinguishes a notion of.topic which he refers to as ua.ny 
sentence initial NP." It is ncit ~lear, however, what l!lotivation 
exists for dis~inguishing the latter category. 
The rule of thematiziation in Japanese, which corresponds roughly 
to the English process of left dislocation, then chooses some unstressed 
noun phrase which "represents the presupposition" and Chomsky-adjoins 
it to the left of the,S. The obj~ctions to such an analysis are as 
follows: 
1. Since thematiziation is optional, if we accept Murak.i's 
suggestion for how the relationship between theme and the rest of 
the sentence is to be interprete·d, this would lead to the conclusion 
that some sentences are about nothing, If the statement that a 
sentence is about something is to have any semantic content at all then 
it seems to me that what the sentence is about must be considered as an 
essential element of a successful.speech act, namely that object (or 
objects) about which a predicatio~ is made and without which successful 
predication is in fact not possible at all. Note, for example, the• absurdity of a statement that only thematized sentences are sentences 
about something if we consider that the English equivalents of 
thematiziation, namely left dislocation and topicalization are not 
as common in English as thematizia.tion is in Japanese. This would 
force us to conclude that Japanese sentences are more often statements 
(questions, etc.) a.bout things th~ are English sentences. 
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. 2~ The. re1:1trictiori that the theme,~m~st "repres~nt the  
pre$1ipp6sition", which is it.self soinewhiit' unclear, accounts for  
· 	 the f'act that two sentences may haye the same presupposition but 
different themes,a,s in (~:18), and (299), but they ma)' not;have a 
theme that is not somehow. included· in the presupposition, as 
illustrated by i;,he unacceptabilit,:y of. (300). 
(298) As for Mary; John gave her the book. 
(299) As for the book, John gave it to Mary. 
(300) *As for John, he gave the book to Mary. 
Notice, however, that ( 300) is unacc.eptable not because the noun 
phrase John is not part of the presupposition associated with the 
structure underlying a particular cleft or pseudo-cleft construction. 
It ·is unacceptable because John is part of the comment, i.e., what 
is actually predicated in. (298)-:-(300) '(notice it h~s primary stress); 
thus, as our theory would also predict it cannot possibly be the 
topic (or theme) . There are, however, perfec·t1y acceptable sentences, 
like (301), where the presupposition necessary to form the relative 
clause of. the pseudo-cleft construction in Muraki 1 s analysis does not 
include the theme. 
( 301) As for Jolm, what Mary said was something that 
didn't concern.him. 
This fact strongly suggests that a different analysis is necessary 
to account for the facts in (298)-(300). 
3, Muraki 1 s analysis of presupposition; like .Chomsky's, does 
not allow a uniform and coherent treatment of this notion, i.e., one 
thatwould relate the presuppositi~ns associated with different 
read~ngs cif a sentence wit~ general presuppositions associated with 
definite referring expressions. Notice, in particular, that a pre-
supposition itself must be a well formed proposition; yet it is not 
at all clear what well-formed l)roposition is represented by 
(302) John Dummy 
which is the presupposition that Muraki assumes for the reading  
of a sentence that answer.s the question--What about John? Even if  
it could be argued that (302) is to. be interpreted as  
(303) There is something which is true of John. 
the analysis stiil does not capture the fact that the presupposition 
associated with a sentence that is an appropriate response to a 
queption like--rlhat about John? is actually existential in nature, 
i.e., it would still be necessary to incorporate into the grammar a 
principle which predicts that the proposition expressed by (302), i.e., 
(303), itself presupposes (304). 
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(304) 	there exists in some real or iin,aginary world 
an individ~cil uniquely identified as John - .· 
·(the· ~eferTing exp~es sioh John uri1que1Y · 
identifies ~omeone o:r ·something). . . .. 
In fact; i:;ince (303) presupposes ( 304) and is at the same time 
entailed by it, (303) cannot possibly be _false, -Le., eit_he:r (304) 
is tl;'ue, in w}:lich case.(303) is true as we;I.1, or (304") is false in 
which case (303) is neither tr1+e nor false; it faiis to make any 
statement at all. The ~everse:does not hold, however, since (304) 
does not ·presuppose (_303). 
10.3. Dahl's Theory. Assuming McCawley's (1968) hypothesis that a 
statement is to be representedtby a proposition plus a set of NP 
descriptions (atomic sentences), roughly as in (305), Dahl (1969) 
proposes· that topic-cor:une_nt structure is a reflectio11 of the inter-
relationship between the atomic sentences. 
(305) 	 s 
I 
s s s 
~ ~ ~ 
xis a man y is a woman -x kissed y 
The topic, _Dahl suggests, is one or more NP descriptions and the 
'proposition will usually be f~mnd in the comment 1 , where the 
relations between the two cor:qisponds to that of a material implication 
in propositional logic. The left hand side of the implication is the 
topic and the right hand side is the comment. . 
Thus, the underlying representations.of (306)~(309) would be 
roughly (306 1 )-(309 1 ) respectiyely. · 
' 	 . 
(306) Lions growl. 1 
(367) Henry won't be coming. 
( 308.) Mary, I don'tilike (her). 
(309) It ~ras the man who won. 
I 
I 	 . 
( 306 I) . (x3 is a lioh)~::J (x3 growls)  
( 307 I) (x3 is Henry:),::J Not. (x3 is coming)- ~  
( 308 I) (x3 is MaryL::) (_(xl is the sp.eaker);::, (x1  
doesn't like x3J) ~ 
( 309 I ) (x3 won) ::::i (.(x3 is a man) :::) (x3 won)) 
l 
where the accent mark av.er the, implication sign signifies that the 
NP desc::ription to the left of the implication r~fers to a definite 
noun phrase.35 The formulas in (306 1 )-(309 1 ) may be represented as 
trees like (310). ' 
·' 
(310) IMPLICATION 
336/ ---s 
~ ~ 
lion growl 
1 
.J 
If x3 in tlle rightmci~t s·iri.(310) is r~placed by the corre$ppnding 
pronmninal form~ the resuit, would be. (31i) :or ( 312) . 
( 311) : A lion, iie growls. 
(312) .· Li6ris, they gro.;.i ~ 
If not, ·the result is (306f or (313). 
( 313) A lion growls. 
There are a number of. probiems with this analysis. First·of 
all, Dahl notes that (309' } and not ( 314) must. be the semantic 
representation of· (309) . 
., 
(314) x3 wori::, x3 is a man 
This is so because (314) does not make it possible to distinguish 
between (309) and (315). 
(315) It was a man who won. 
(309' ), however, cannot possibly be the semantic representation .for 
(309). The repre~entation in ( 309'), p ::, ( q :::> p), is a tautology. 
What it "says is that if som~ individual ~on, then if he is a man he 
won. This statement, which is necessarily true, is clearly not what 
·is expressed by (309). 
Secondly, these. representations do not adequately account for the 
fact that the successful identification of the NP descriptioi:i (the 
topic). is a necessary condition fo;r the successful predication of 
the proposition to the right of the implication .sign (the comment). 
In a review of Dahl's work·, Wayles Browtle (1972) has pointed out that 
if implication is. being used in the accustomed logical sense (which 
Dahl seems to be claiming it is) then, for example, (307' ) holds true 
in any instance[ in which x3 refers.to something or someone other thari 
Henry, since a false a.ntece\3.ent makes a mute rial implication true. 
Even if these objections to Dahl's proposals did not ex~st, there 
is, I believe, a good reason to prefer the analysis that I have proposed 
in this chapter. Aside from the fact that generic statements like 
( 30'6) may be paraphrased by a· hypothetical statement like ( 316), Dahl 
offers no evidence for why his theory should be preferred over some 
reasonable alternative. All other things being equal,· the more highly 
valued theory should, I believe, be the one that posits underlying 
structures which are more !natural' and relatively less remote from 
observable semantic and syntactic facts. Few speakers of English (or 
any other language) would agree that when they utter a sentence like 
(308) what they are r~ally saying is that if a particular individual 
is Mary they don't like her, or that (316) really means that if a 
particulai set of individuals is the Me.ts they will win the Series. 
(316) The Mets wJll probably win the Series; 
Any theory which deviates to .this extent from native speakers' semantic. 
·-.·--,--- ----• ----~~~~~·· • ,~,.·_• -·."--. •_,• ••• ,a,-.,-- --- • • • • 0 0 
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intuitions requires strong justiffo:ation. Yet., asJde f'rom (1) t.he .  
fact that some sent ences, for example; general statements, have  
. 'natural-, .hypothetical paraphrases and (2) it -is possible to 
represent the topic":comment distirycti6n in logical structure by_ 
assuming an implication relation.phip between atomic sentences, Dahl 
offers no evidence for why his theory should be p;eferi·ed over .~o~e 
reasonable alte_rnative. That the t.heory which I have proposed is more 
1natural I abd less remote from observable ~semantic. and syntactic facts  
is demonstrated, I believe, by th~ following facts.  
1. There are constructions in Engl~sh (and in other languages 
as well), namely dislocated (and topicalized) sentences, in which the 
division of the sentence ihto top~c and comment is structurally explicit. 
Such constructions have in fact the structure which I have proposed 
underlies and accounts for the topic-comment distinction in all 
s.entences. While· most (possibly all) languages contain conditi6nal 
sentenc.es, the purpose of such constructiops is not to make clear the 
divis ion into topic and comment, but to state that a conditional 
relationship exists between the propositions expressed by two sentences. 
2. There are mahy languages in, which the most common sentence  
form is one which has the structure  
s 
-~ 
NP S 
I I 
i.e. a structure roughly corresponding to a left-dislocated sentence  
in English. There is, as far as± know, no language in which the  
typical sentence form is a condit_ional construction.  
3. In general, any sentence in English.has a natural paraphrase  
in which the noun phrase which is topic is adjoined to the left of  
the highest sentence, .optiom,tlly preceded by an about element. As  
was noted above·, however, only a restricted set of sentences have  
·natural hypothetical pani.phrases.: -~ 
4. In a very interesting paper (which to some extent led me  
to investigate this topic) Gruber (1969) notes that at a certain stage  
in the development of a child 1s grammar of English, the typical  
sentence structure is one in which a noun phrase is adjoined to the  
left (or sometimes to the right) of a sentence, i.e:, roughly the ·  
type of structure that I have proposed underlies and represents the  
topic-comment distinqtion in all sentences of an adult grammar.  
Footnote·s 
-:,Th1s pa.per is a slightly revised version of Chapter 3 of my  
dissertation, The Role of Topic and Comment in Linguistic· Theory.  
University of Texas, Austin,·1974.  
1. No theoretical significance should be attached to my use 
of these terms or to the term pronominal remnant which I will sometimes 
. /, 
:\ 
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. tise to refer to the pronoun in the matrix:. sentence that.: corresponds 
to the dislocated noun: phrase. I do,pot m:ean tiy imply thereby that 
the dislocated noun pru:ase has actually. l;ieen moved or disioc:::ated ~tit 
of its po~itit>n irt the sent«knce; in fact, r·w11i. argu~ that just the 
opposite ±s t4e case~ 
2.. Two important empiricai assumptions are implicit, in this  
rather rough formulation:, (1) there i~ no" need to distinguish in  
descriptions of natural languages between unit sets and indi,viduals  
(2) we refer to· a,nd talk ~bout members of a group collectively in the 
. . . 	 . . . ,, . . . ( . 
same way that we talk about and refet' to individual membe:i;s of a group  
and both ca·rry presuppositions of exi.stence. There is thus no reason  
to assume, as is often done ip quantificational logic, that the only  
· subject-:-predicate (topic-comment) s.tatements are statements in the 
singular while, all other statements are existential. 
3. This structure, like all others represented ,in this thesis, 
is grossly oversimplified. ,,... I have omitted all details except those 
that are immediately relevant to the point under discussion. In 
particular here the pronoWl ~ ~ost likely also originates oµtside of 
S', its position in S' being occupied by ·another variable. I do not 
believe, however, that all no.un phrases origina,te outside, the 
propsition (cf. Mccawley 1970), in particular, not specific indefinites, 
which are introduced into~, bY an existential quantifier, or any NP 
which does not .carry an existential presupposition. . 
4! Similar observations have.been made by Hankamer (1972:198). 
5 ., I will henceforth use the terms 'about.' element, 'about.,  
phrase to refer in _general to phrases co1itaining an element which  
means roughly 'about ' , e.g. concerning, a·s for, ·etc. ,  
6. I am assuming here· that ·the .most abstract representation of 
all sentences contains a higher perforpiative clause. For arguments 
in favor of this hypothes.is see Ross (19 ) and S1:1.dock (19· ) .· I will 
omit the performative c:iause from tree diagrams, except in those cases 
wher·e it is irnmidiately re:J,.evant to the point at issue. · 
7, Similar claims have been made by other authors. Cf., for  
example, the discussion in.Chafe (19 .  
8. This is s·ometimes used as an argument against the hypothesis  
which I argue for in Gundel (1974: Chapter 5)), that topicalized  
sentences like (i) are derived from dis:J._ocated,sentences by a rule·  
that deletes the pronominal remnant.·  
(i) That book, I haven't read_yet. 
Indefinite noun phrases may be topicalized, as illustrated by the  
grammaticality cif (ii) and (iii).  
(ii) A dog I don't have. 
(iii) 	. A Norwegian I don't think you could persuade her 
.. to marry. 
9; Certain nt>n-restrictive clauses are possible after· a non- 
specific ind~finite, e.g.;  
( i) Alice would like to marry a Norwegian, who is 
bound to be dependable. 
. . . . . . . . . . 
... ,; : 
I, 
. I. 
I 
10. ,Unless,. of course, singular n11m.ber is n.~~essarily iinI>lied, 
as in ( 3i ) , f'ci:f ex~mpl~ . . l ... 
11. Unless these·a:te al-re;ady plural. e.g. 
) 
.· ( i) I forget to brin'g two dresses; the. blue one and 
the red orie .. ; 
12. This is .generaliy the! case when the matrix sentence does 
not "contai~ a rioun ph:faie. ~hat is core:('.erential .with ·the dislocated NP. 
13.. Actually• J believe 'that if something like this solution 
turns out to be co:r;rect' the order' of th~- two coil..]'uricts is s:i.gnificant. 
In these sentences, fci:f Eixa:mple:,·the order should be the reverse of 
what it is in ( 31 i) arid ( 31 11 )< : At least two reasons suggest·. this: 
(1) the position of the priroarYi stress a.rid (2) the rather counter-
intuitive impli!:!at.io.ri of (31 1) that in uttering (31)' the speaker is 
asserting the ~xistence of hone'st politicians. Thus, a more correct 
representation of ( 31), it seems to me,·· would be 
' ( i) Ex (Gwendolyn wo,uld like to marry X and (that) 
X is ari· hcines;t politician). 
14. I leave open for the 'present the exact representat:ion of 
these structures. , 
15. For an interesting d:i:scussion of the notion of specificity 
and vario1.1s logical arid linguis,tic problems in attempting to ·account 
for it, see Dean (197i). · ! · 
16.. Fcir furth~r discussi0:n of this claim, see Guridel (1974). 
17. Notice that the noun :phrases modified by only and even 
always have primary' stress. We would correctly predict therefore 
that they can never be dislocat,ed (because they can ·never be topicsJ' 
even when·the quantifier is left l;>ehind. 
. · 18~ The exis.tence of sentences like those in (88) in Japanese, 
where a sentence with an initial NP-wa has no corresponding sentence 
out of. which 'this n·oun phrase may ha-ye been moved, are used by Kuno 
(1972) as -~vidence that this noun phrase already is an adjunct to 
the main sentence in the. underlying structure.arid is not moved out 
by a chopping or copying ~ule. ; _ ·· _, . . . 
l9. T_he Complex Noun. Phrase Constraint - is sta~ed as· follows: 
No 	 element contained iin a sentence dominated by a 
noun phrase with a:lexical head noun may be moved 
out of that noun phrase by a transformation. 
20. Sentential Subject Ccinstraint: 
No elemerit dominated.by.an Smay be mbved out of that 
S if that node Sis dominated by an NP which itself 
is immediately dom~nated by S. 
'21. 	 Left Branch Condition: 
No NP which is the leftmost constituent of a larger 
NP can be reora.ere4 out of this NP by ·a transformational 
rule. : 
22. What is meant by this statement is roughly that the element 
may be mpved over an indefinit~ly large amo~t of material, i.e., it 
may originate indefinitely far'down iri the tree. Thus, in t:tie stl?-te..,. 
ment of the rule, variables ar~ used because it is impossible to 
list all the ele~ents over whi¢h the noun phrase may be moved. 
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·23, See, for example~ ·sanders and Tai ·(1969), Drachman (1970),
24. · This senterice may be acceptable as an example of rela-
ti·viza.t'ion with a proniminal remnant iri the emb_edded sentence, where 
·it means that the friend bit the dog; hut thi_s is not the meaning 
intended here. 
25~ In Russian, where word order is considered to be 'free',  
it is ih fact considerably restr.icted in precisely those clauses  
where left dislocation is unacceptable in English. This point is  
discussed further in Gundel (1974). ·  
26. This is equally true for dislocated noun phrases in general. 
27. '.!'his seems to me somewhat better than him himself, them  
themselves, etc., possibly because t.he phonetic form of you and your  
(self) is ·different.  
28. This is not true, of course, if the sentence is itself a  
question.  
29, More exactly it answers some implicit 9r explicit question--
'What about you and topic-comment structure?, i.e., what is the 
relation between you and topic-°cc)mment structure, where the topic 
is a conjoined NP and one of the members of the conjunction need not 
be overtly expressed, though it is still implicit in the question. 
For the purpose of the present discussion, however, I will ignore this 
complication. 
30. This convention.introduced in Ross (1967) deletes a (non- 
root) S-node ·if, the latter does not branch, i.e. , does not dominate  
more than one node,  
31, This is essentially the con4ition for successful reference  
proposed in Searle (1969:95).  
32. This claim would be disputed by many linguists; in particular 
those who adhere to the widely held hypothesis that _the it in a cleft 
sentence like It ~as Harry who hit Bill is semantically empty, i.e., 
is not an anaphoric pronoun. In Gundel (1974) I put forirard a 
different proposal, namely that the it in the cleft sentence is a 
pronominalization of the relative clause in the corresponding pseudo-
cleft sentence. In any case, the source of the deleted clause who 
hit Loretta still remains to be explained in a theory which does not 
derive the sentences under discussion from correspo~ding equative 
structures. 
33, I am grateful to Stanley Peters for. pointing out t6 me that  
Chomsky Is proposed analysis of focus and presupposition could be  
interpreted in this way .  
. - 34. For some more arguments against Chomsky's proposal to inter-
pret focus and.presupposition from surface structure, see Lakoff and 
Postal (1972), 
35. Browne (1972) notes the difficulty connected with Dahl's  
attempt to account for definite reference in this manner. He writes  
"Is this a quality that can· just be postulated? Are we to interpret  
(23) as is a lion and.if it is definite it grows?' or perhaps1 i 3 
'if X3 is definite and a liori it gr()wls." 
36. Dahl actually writes AF (= atomic formula). here instead of S. 
• -1 ••.•••• ,_,_. ____ _·-,--•··~-~---"',---···' ,¥,.;__·----.·-. ~·---,"~-·-: -......~•. --·~· ..__,_,' .··, .. --·~····...--.- ,.,.,,,,,. .... ·... "~' 4- ••---·-------·-·--- . . . 
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